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I. CASE LAW UPDATE
HE first part of this article discusses judicial developments relating
to the Texas law of intestacy, wills, estate administration, trusts,
and other estate planning matters during the survey period of Oc-
tober 1, 1998 through September 30, 1999. Not all cases decided during
the survey period are presented and not all aspects of each cited case are
analyzed. Writ histories were current as of September 10, 2000.1
The discussion of most cases include a moral, that is, the important
lesson to be learned from the case. By recognizing situations which have
lead to time consuming and costly litigation in the past, the reader may be




The intestate distribution rules are rigid and do not take into account
the relationships between family members other than those dictated by
biology. The potential intent-defeating ramifications of dying intestate
are demonstrated by the case of Lane v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company.2 Intestate died in an automobile accident and was
covered by an underinsured motorist policy purchased by his maternal
grandparents. Insurer examined the Texas Probate Code3 and deter-
mined that it should pay the benefits equally to Father and Mother be-
cause Intestate had no spouse and no descendants. Mother rejected
1. Writ histories were derived from the KeyCite service as provided on WESTLAW.
2. 992 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
3. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 38(a)(2) (Vernon 1980).
2000] 1233
SMU LAW REVIEW
Insurer's tender of a draft contending that Insured should not have paid
Father. The trial court granted Insurer's request for a summary judgment
on this and other issues not relevant to this discussion.
The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment with regard to the
distribution of the underinsured motorist benefits. 4 Mother's claim that
the benefits should have been paid to the Intestate's estate lacked merit
because no administration of Intestate's estate existed; Insurer could not
have paid the proceeds to an administrator.5 The court indicated that an
intestate's estate immediately passes to the heirs, subject only to recovery
of possession by a subsequently appointed administrator. 6
2. Non-Marital Children
The inheritance rights of non-marital children have a long and complex
history.7 In re Estate of Chavana8 demonstrates that a non-marital child
may be able to prove paternity with only a preponderance of the evi-
dence in a probate action if the alleged father died prior to the 1987
amendment to the Texas Probate Code which requires proof by clear and
convincing evidence.9 Intestate died in 1985 with three non-marital chil-
dren. Intestate married the mother of Son after Son's birth but never
married the mother of Daughters. Intestate acknowledged that all three
children were his. Son claimed that he was the sole heir under the law
existing at the time of Intestate's death. Daughter One argued that the
1985 statute was unconstitutional. In addition, she claimed that Intestate
equitably adopted both Daughters. The lower court ruled against Daugh-
ters. In 1988, an appellate court reversed holding that the trial court had
prematurely decided that Intestate had actually died without a valid
will. 10 The court also indicated that the constitutional and equitable
adoption points lacked merit.'1
Almost a decade later, the trial judge determined that Intestate had
indeed died without a valid will. The judge ruled that all three children
were heirs because the Supreme Court of Texas had ruled that the 1985
provision on legitimacy was unconstitutional 12 and there was sufficient
evidence to support Daughters' paternity claims. Son appealed.
The appellate court affirmed.13 The court rejected Son's claim that in
1988 the appellate court had affirmed the trial court's determination that
4. See Lane, 992 S.W.2d at 554.
5. See id. at 552.
6. See id. (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 37 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000)).
7. See generally ALOYSIUS A. LEOPOLD & GERRY W. BEYER, TEXAS LAW OF WILLS
§ 6.4 (9 Tex. Prac. 1992) (discussing development of inheritance rights of non-marital chil-
dren under Texas law).
8. 993 S.W.2d 311 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
9. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42(b) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
10. See Guajardo v. Chavana, 762 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1988,
writ denied).
11. See id. at 684.
12. See Dickson v. Simpson, 807 S.W.2d 726, 727 (Tex. 1991).
13. See In re Estate of Guajardo, 993 S.W.2d at 319.
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Son was the sole heir when it stated that Daughters' claims were without
merit.14 This statement did not create a binding "law of the case" which
must be followed in subsequent litigation.' 5 The court refused to apply
this discretionary doctrine to reach the unconstitutional result of depriv-
ing Daughters of an opportunity to prove paternity.16 The court also re-
jected Son's argument that the Texas Supreme Court's notation of "writ
denied" acted to give res judicata effect to dicta in the original case.17
The court then rejected Son's assertion that the statute of limitations
had run on the paternity actions because non-marital children may peti-
tion the probate court for a determination of a right to inherit under the
Texas Probate Code without regard to the feasibility of a paternity action
under the Family Code.18 Daughters had timely asserted their claims in
the probate action, unlike the claimants in cases such as Cantu v.
Sapenter19 where the purported child waited eleven years from the date
of the alleged father's death to present a claim which the court conse-
quently held to be barred by the residuary four-year statute of
limitations .20
The court next determined the proper standard of proof that Daugh-
ters must meet to prove paternity. Although current law requires heir-
ship to be determined by clear and convincing evidence, Intestate died
prior to the enactment of this law and thus it was sufficient for the trial
court to find heirship upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 21
The appellate court reviewed the evidence of paternity and determined
that the trial court's finding of paternity was supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 22
3. Escheat
If a person dies intestate and without heirs, the person's property will
escheat to the Texas government.2 3 This rare event occurred in the case
of In re Estate of Torrance.24 Intestate died in 1959 in New York City. In
a subsequent action by the New York public administrator, the State of
Texas intervened asserting that various oil and gas interests escheated be-
cause Intestate had no heirs. Over the next several years, numerous indi-
viduals claimed to be Intestate's heirs. The lower courts rejected these
claims until 1997 when a court held that four individuals were Intestate's
14. See id. at 315.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 319. Even if the law of the case applied, Dickson v. Simpson, 807 S.W.2d
726 (Tex. 1991), would act to overrule it.
17. See id. at 316.
18. See id. at 317 (citing TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 42 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000)).
19. 937 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
20. See id. at 553.
21. See In re Estate of Chavana, 993 S.W.2d at 318.
22. See id. at 319.
23. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 71.001 (Vernon 1995).
24. 991 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.).
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grandchildren and thus entitled to inherit the estate. The State of Texas
appealed.
The appellate court reversed and held that Intestate's property es-
cheated.2 5 The court examined the evidence and found that it was insuffi-
cient to support the trial court's finding that the grandchildren's parent
was actually Intestate's child.26 The court analyzed a maze of evidence
which included allegations that three separately named people were actu-
ally the same individual and that Intestate was a light-skinned African-
American who after giving birth to the grandchildren's father abandoned
him, changed her name, pretended to be white, and married a white
man.27 The court characterized the theory as "intriguing" but determined
that there was insufficient evidence to support it.28 Thus, relatively solid
evidence of heirship is needed because courts will not permit heirship
determinations to stand if they are based merely on speculation.
B. WILLS
1. Formalities
A will must be executed with the formalities mandated by the Texas
Probate Code to be valid. 29 Although strict compliance is normally re-
quired, an important statutory exception exists and is demonstrated in the
case of In re Estate of Livingston.30 Son filed Testator's 1991 will for pro-
bate. Daughter contested alleging that Testator had executed a new will
in 1997 which revoked the 1991 will. Both the trial and appellate courts
rejected Son's claim that the 1997 will was invalid because it was unwit-
nessed. 31 Son asserted that the fact that the witnesses did sign the self-
proving affidavit was irrelevant. Son's argument was unsuccessful be-
cause he failed to realize that the Boren32 rule, which required the will
and the self-proving affidavit to be independently signed, was repealed by
a 1991 amendment to the Texas Probate Code which permits a signature
on a self-proving affidavit to be considered as being on the will itself.33
Nonetheless, the witnesses should sign the actual will, rather than just the
self-proving affidavit. Although the will would still be valid, the will
would not be treated as self-proving thereby necessitating additional
proof during the probate process. 34
25. See id. at 104.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 101.
28. See id.
29. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
30. 999 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.).
31. See id. at 876-77.
32. See Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966).





Every will should expressly cover the possibility of pretermitted chil-
dren, that is, children who are born to or adopted by the testator after the
testator executes the will. The testator should (a) specifically indicate
that a pretermitted child takes nothing or (b) provide a mechanism for
determining a share for the child. Litigation may result if the testator did
not take these precautions as demonstrated by Estate of Gorski v.
Welch. 35 Testator's will left his entire estate to his three adult sons and
excluded his two adult daughters. After executing his will, Testator had a
third daughter (Pretermitted Child). Testator consented to a final decree
in a paternity suit and agreed, among other things, to pay child support
and maintain medical insurance on Pretermitted Child. After Testator
died, the trial court awarded 25% of Testator's estate to Pretermitted
Child under the pretermitted child statute.36 The court rejected the argu-
ment that the statute did not apply because the paternity decree acted to
"otherwise provide for" Pretermitted Child. 37
The appellate court reversed, 38 determining wthat Testator's obligation
to pay child support and maintain medical insurance did not terminate
upon Testator's death because of the contractual consent to the paternity
decree. 39 Thus, the decree was binding on Testator's estate.40 The court
also noted that Pretermitted Child was receiving social security death
benefits. 41 The court then held that Pretermitted Child was provided for
outside of Testator's will by a provision intended to take effect at Testa-
tor's death.42 Testator disposed of his property through the payment of
social security taxes and as a result of that payment, Pretermitted Child
received benefits upon his death 43 In addition, Testator's intention that
the child support payments would continue after his death is evidence
that Testator did not exclude Pretermitted Child from his will due to in-
advertence or oversight.44
3. Revocation
By Agreement Incident to Divorce
A testator must comply with the requirements of the Texas Probate
Code to revoke a will.4 5 As In re Estate of Wilson46 verifies, other at-
35. 993 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
36. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 67 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
37. See Estate of Gorski, 993, S.W.2d at 302.
38. See id. at 305.
39. See id. at 302-03.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 303.
42. See id. at 305.
43. See id.
44. See id. This case also has an interesting discussion of whether social security bene-
fits may be used as a credit against a child support obligation that continues after death.
The court indicated that it would follow the view that a credit is allowed.
45. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 63 (Vernon 1980).
46. 7 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, pet. denied).
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tempts to revoke will be ineffective despite the testator's intent to nullify
the will. In this case, Husband and Wife executed a joint will and were
later divorced. Husband died without changing the will. The trial court
determined that the agreement incident to the divorce acted to revoke
the will.
The appellate court reversed by explaining that the Texas Probate
Code enumerates the only methods by which a testator may revoke a will,
that is, by physical act or a subsequent writing executed with the same
requirements as a will. 47 The agreement incident to Husband's and
Wife's divorce did not meet those requirements and thus did not operate
to revoke the will. 48
Presumption if Original Not Found
Hunter v. Palmer49 shows that a person asserting the existence of a lost
will or codicil will have little difficulty presenting sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumed revocation presumption and preclude a summary
judgment. Decedent executed a will in 1982 and a codicil in 1986. After
she died in 1997, neither document could be found. Sons requested an
intestate administration and Daughter filed an application to probate De-
cedent's lost will. Sons opposed the probate based on the presumption
that Decedent had revoked her will because the original could not be
found and there was no evidence that Decedent had not voluntarily re-
voked the will. Daughter responded by claiming that the presumption
was inapplicable because Sons had not established that the will and codi-
cil were last seen in her possession or in a place to which she had ready
access. The trial court granted Sons' motion for summary judgment.
The appellate court reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Decedent's will was last seen in her posses-
sion.50 The court found the statements of the drafting attorney that De-
cedent took the original will and "probably" took the original codicil as
sufficient to preclude summary judgment.5 1
4. Construction
No Apparent Ambiguity-Use of Extrinsic Evidence
Regardless of the unambiguous nature of the terms used in a will, many
Texas courts admit extrinsic evidence to vary the plain meaning of those
terms. Thus, a testator must carefully select the words used in the will to
minimize the possibility of a court straying from those words. On the
other hand, a person attempting to show that the testator meant some-
thing different from the exact terms of the will has the opportunity to
introduce evidence of the testator's actual usage. The Lang v. San
47. See id. at 171.
48. See id.
49. 988 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).




Antonio Area Foundation52 case reminds testators of the tremendous im-
portance of selecting depositive words with care. In Lang, Testatrix de-
vised certain real property to Niece and Nephew. The lower court ruled
that assets related to that real property, such as promissory notes, collec-
tions, and net profit interests, were not part of the devised property and
thus passed to the residuary beneficiary. The court refused to admit ex-
trinsic evidence showing that Testatrix thought of the land, the notes, and
the profits as one "investment package" which she meant to pass by the
devise to Niece and Nephew.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court should have
considered the extrinsic evidence. 53 The court indicated that even though
the terms of the will are unambiguous, "the court may turn to extrinsic
evidence of surrounding circumstances to ascertain the meaning of the
words used in the will."' 54 The extrinsic evidence may show that Testatrix
was referring to a bundle of assets that comprised an established family
business investment, not just the actual land, and thus summary judgment
was improper.55
"Nieces and Nephews"
Wills should expressly state what type of relationship is needed to fall
within a class gift, that is, must the relationship be by blood or will a
relationship by affinity suffice. Failure of the will to indicate clearly the
testator's intent may result in a dispute such as the one in Martin v.
Palmer.56 Testator's will named Testator's "nieces and nephews" as bene-
ficiaries. A dispute arose as to whether this phrase referred only to Testa-
tor's "blood" nieces and nephews or whether it also referred to Testator's
"affinity" nieces and nephews, that is, the nieces and nephews of Testa-
tor's predeceased wife. The trial court held that Testator's will only re-
ferred to his nieces and nephews by blood, and not to the nieces and
nephews of Testator's predeceased wife.
The appellate court reversed because Testator's blood nieces and neph-
ews failed to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact regard-
ing the meaning of the phrase "nieces and nephews" as used in Testator's
will.5 7 The court reviewed the evidence which demonstrated, for exam-
ple, that Testator and his wife had been married for 50 years, had no
children, treated some of the nieces and nephews as if they were their
own children, referred to the nieces and nephews as their own without
making any distinction based on whether the person was related by blood
or affinity, and executed reciprocal wills leaving their residuary estates to
52. 5 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. App.-San Antonio, 1999, pet. granted).
53. See id. at 743.
54. Id. at 742.
55. See id. The court also noted two other issues which are tied to the admission of
extrinsic evidence. First, the possibility of ademption because some of the real property
had been sold after Testatrix executed her will and second, the application of TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 58(c) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000), the Texas "contents" statute.
56. 1 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
57. See id. at 881.
2000] 1239
SMU LAW REVIEW
the nieces and nephews without making a reference to the type of rela-
tionship, if the other spouse had already died.58
The court determined that there is no Texas authority which mandates
that the phrase "nieces and nephews" refers only to those individuals re-
lated by blood.59 A reasonable fact finder could infer that the Testator
and his wife intended to pass their ultimate estates to their nieces and
nephews as a class composed of both individuals related by blood and
affinity. 60
Exercise of Power of Appointment
In Wright v. Greenberg,6' Mother's will created a testamentary trust for
Father. The trust granted Father "the power to appoint the entire re-
maining principal ... by will."'62 If Father failed to exercise this power,
the remaining trust property would pass to a trust created for Daughter's
benefit. Father died with a will stating that he intended to dispose of all
of his property "including any property over which I may have a power of
appointment. '63 Father's will left the residuary of his estate to an inter
vivos trust he created thirteen years after Mother's death. The trial court
determined that Father's will exercised his testamentary power of ap-
pointment. Daughter appealed, asserting that Father's will failed to exer-
cise the power of appointment because Father's will (1) failed to actually
dispose of the property, (2) did not expressly refer to the power of ap-
pointment created in Mother's will, and (3) did not make a reference to
the property that was the subject of the power of appointment. 64
The appellate court rejected Daughter's arguments and affirmed.65
The court began its analysis by discussing the landmark case of Republic
National Bank of Dallas v. Fredericks,66 which set forth the basic rules
regarding the exercise of a power of appointment:
The general rule is that in order for a will or deed to constitute the
exercise of a power of appointment the intent to exercise such power
must be so clear that no other reasonable intent can be imputed
under the will. The will must refer (1) to the power of appointment
or (2) to the property subject to such power, or (3) the donee of the
power must have owned no other property to which the will could
have attached and thus the will have been a vain and useless thing
except it be held to be an exercise of the power .... If, from the
circumstances or the instrument executed, it be doubtful as to
whether it was the intention to execute the power possessed by the
grantor, then it will not be held that by such act or conveyance that
58. See id. Being a case of first impression in Texas, the court also conducted an exten-
sive review of out-of-state cases and secondary authorities.
59. See id. at 880-81.
60. See id. at 881.
61. 2 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [14h Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
62. Id. at 669.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 671.
65. See id. at 677.
66. 283 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. 1955).
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power was in fact executed. 67
The court determined that the Republic National Bank test only re-
quires the will to satisfy one of three enumerated criteria to be a valid
exercise of the power of appointment. 68 In this case, Father's will ex-
pressly stated that he intended to dispose of any property over which he
had a power of appointment. The court found that this was adequate to
refer to the power of appointment and to exercise that power in favor of
his residuary estate.69
A well-reasoned dissent argues that Father's will was inadequate to ac-
tually exercise the power.
The mere inclusion of the generic words 'power of appointment' in
the introductory section should not be elevated to an exercise of a
specific power, especially where the identity of the appointee is miss-
ing and must be supplied by reference to an entirely different part of
the will (the residuary clause), which itself does not mention the
power of appointment and which is not tied, directly or indirectly, to
the section that does. 70
To avoid the type of problem raised by the Wright case, a will should
clearly indicate that the testator is exercising a power of appointment if
such is consistent with the testator's intent. Language such as, "I hereby
exercise the power of appointment granted to me in [description of in-
strument creating power of appointment] in favor of [name of ap-
pointee]" may reduce claims of an improper exercise of the power.
Future Interests
Interpretation and construction problems are bound to occur when a
will creates unusual types of future interests as seen in the case of
Deviney v. NationsBank.71 Testator devised his interest in certain prop-
erty as to Wife and Daughters
share and share alike, on the express condition and limitation that
said interest .remain undivided and be kept in tact [sic] with the other
undivided interest of my brothers and sisters, until such time as all of
the joint owners should desire to partition, sell or otherwise dispose
of the entire interest in all or any part of said property, and provided
further that in the event of the death of my wife or either of my said
daughters before the same shall have been partitioned or disposed of
as aforesaid, the interest of such deceased shall pass to the survivor
or survivors, and in the event my wife and both of my said daughters
should die before said property has been partitioned or disposed of
as aforesaid, then my interest in such part of the said "Roe Taylor
Estate" land shall pass to my brothers and sisters, save and except
Isla Taylor Clendening, who no longer owns an interest in said Estate
Property, and in the event any of my said brothers and sisters, except
the said Isla Taylor Clendening, should then be deceased, the share
67. Id. at 46-47 (numbering added).
68. See Wright, 2 S.W.3d at 671.
69. See id. at 673.
70. Id. at 678 (Frost, J. dissenting).
71. 993 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, pet. denied).
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of such Decedent shall pass to his or her Descendants per stirpes.
My said wife and daughters shall not have the right to sell or other-
wise dispose of their interest in the said "Roe Taylor Estate" prop-
erty so long as it shall remain in tact [sic] as an undivided interest,
except by the joinder of the other co-owners. If and when the said
Estate Property shall be partitioned with the consent of the other co-
owners as aforesaid, the share and interest set aside to my said wife
and daughters shall vest in them in fee simple without any limitations
or conditions.
Wife predeceased Testator and thus her interest passed though the re-
siduary clause of Testator's will to Daughters. Both Daughters have also
died. NationsBank as independent executor of one of the daughter's es-
tates and as trustee of her trust received conflicting opinions regarding
whether it had any interest in this property. One attorney indicated that
NationsBank had no interest because the property was not partitioned
while Daughters were alive. On the other hand, another attorney opined
that the conditions in Testator's will constituted an invalid restraint on
alienation and, thus, this daughter owned a fee simple interest in the
property which should be distributed according to the terms of her trust.
NationsBank subsequently filed a declaratory judgment to determine the
correct outcome. The trial court declared Testator's conditions and limi-
tations void and that the daughter's estate owned an undivided half inter-
est in the property.
The appellate court reversed. 72 The court began its analysis by review-
ing the estates and future interests law of Texas. The court then recog-
nized that Testator did not want the property partitioned unless all co-
owners agreed.73 The will granted to Daughters a life estate as joint te-
nants with rights of survivorship. The court believed the restraint on par-
tition lasted a reasonable time because the restraint was limited to the
lives of Daughters.74 Thus, the court held that this partial restraint on
alienation was permissible.75
The remainder interest following Daughters' life estate, which would
vest if the property had not already been partitioned (as was the case),
was held by Testator's Siblings. 76 The court determined that Siblings held
a defeasible fee interest subject to a shifting executory limitation, that is,
a partition by Daughters which would automatically vest full ownership
in Daughters. 77
The court then examined the provision which provided that Daughters
could not convey (as contrasted with partition) their interests in the prop-
erty without the co-owners' consents. The court held that this was an
invalid disabling restraint on alienation.7 8 However, Daughters could
72. See id. at 452.
73. See id. at 450.
74. See id. at 451.
75. See id.
76. See id.




only convey what they owned as discussed above. 79
Because Daughters had not partitioned the property, Daughters had
no interest which existed after they died or to pass at death; their estate
had no title or interest in the property. 80 Instead, Testator's Siblings and
their descendants became the fee owners of the property.81 To avoid this
type of technical and confusing analysis, the better practice is to place the
property in trust and provide the trustee with instructions regarding the
management and use of the property.
Tax Apportionment
Tax provisions in a will must be clear. To avoid any doubt as to the
testator's intent, the will should expressly state whether the testator wants
(a) tax apportionment as provided by the Texas Probate Code82 and the
Internal Revenue Code,83 (b) the residuary of the estate to bear the bur-
den of estate taxes on both probate and nonprobate assets, or (c) some
other specifically described approach. Peterson v. Mayse84 demonstrates
a problem that may arise when the testator does not follow this advice.
Testator died with a taxable estate consisting primarily of nonprobate as-
sets, such as life insurance proceeds. An issue arose regarding the source
of payment of the estate taxes, that is, are they apportioned according to
Probate Code § 322A and I.R.C. § 2206 or does the will provide for the
residuary of the probate estate to serve as the primary source of funds to
pay the estate taxes. The following two provisions of Testator's will are
relevant:
Death Taxes, Debts and Expenses-The Executor shall pay any death
taxes out of my property passing under paragraph 2(C) hereof [the
residuary clause]. All of my debts, funeral expenses, and expenses
incurred in the administration of my estate paid by the executor shall
be paid out of my property passing under paragraph 2(C) hereof.
10(E). Death Taxes-The term "Death taxes" shall refer to all es-
tate, inheritance, and succession taxes, together with any interest or
penalties thereon, which are assessed by reason of my death (other
than any taxes imposed by Chapter 13 or Section 2032A of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code). 85
The trial court determined that this language of the will did not override
the tax apportionment statutes. Accordingly, the trial court held that
both probate and nonprobate assets were proportionately burdened by
estate tax liability.
The appellate court reversed,86 holding that the language of the will
clearly and unambiguously provided that death taxes should first be paid
79. See id.
80. See id. at 452.
81. See id.
82. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
83. See I.R.C. §§ 2206, 2207, 2207A (West 1998).
84. 993 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, pet. denied).




from the assets described in the residuary clause of Testator's will.87 Tes-
tator did not limit the payment of death taxes to only those due because
of probate assets. 88 The court recognized that the Texas Probate Code
does not require specific mention that death taxes on nonprobate assets
are to be paid by the estate to override the apportionment presumption.89
"It is true that nothing in the will expressly exonerates the nonprobate
property from the burden of death taxes; however, the statute does not
make such a requirement." 90 The court determined Testator's simple
words were clear and that "[n]o presumption can supplant plain and un-
ambiguous language." 91 Finally, the court also stated that it could "not
give an unambiguous will a meaning different from that warranted by its
words merely to carry out a hypothesis as to the decedent's intention."92
The court declined to determine whether apportionment would apply
to the payment of death taxes that would remain after exhausting the
residuary estate. The court declined to rule on this issue because the trial
court had not addressed it.93
Conditional Gift
To carry out the likely intent of a divorced testator not to leave prop-
erty to former stepchildren, a sympathetic court may adopt an interpreta-
tion of a will which ignores the express language of both the will and
Texas statutes. In In re Estate of Wilson,94 Husband and Wife executed a
joint will and were later divorced. The will provided for the survivor to
receive the entire estate. The will also provided that "all property...
owned by the one of us dying last shall at his or her death pass to our
children." Although Husband and Wife had no children, together, each
had children from prior relationships. Husband died without changing
the will.
The appellate court first eliminated Wife's gift under Texas law which
automatically voids testamentary gifts made during marriage to the for-
mer spouse.95 The court then focused on the provision of the will stating
that "all property.., owned by the one of us dying last shall at his or her
death pass to our children. ' 96 Wife's children argued that this was a re-
siduary clause making a class gift to children of both former partners and
that all of the children were beneficiaries. Wife's children supported their
argument with the Probate Code's language that the will "must be read as
if the former spouse failed to survive the testator" 97 which thus created
87. See id. at 220.
88. See id. at 222.
89. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
90. Peterson, 993 S.W.2d at 221.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 222.
93. See id.
94. 7 S.W.3d 169 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1999, pet. denied).
95. See id. at 171 (applying TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (West 1980 & Supp. 2000)).
96. See id.
97. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
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the legal fiction that Wife had already died and that Husband was legally
the spouse who died last.
The appellate court rejected this argument and held that the will did
not contain a residuary clause.98 Instead, the language at issue created a
conditional gift to the children. 99 The condition was not met because
Wife was still biologically alive and, thus, Husband's estate passed by in-
testate succession to his only child.100
5. Contractual Wills
Strong evidence is needed to establish a contractual will, even if the
will is governed by former Texas law which did not require the will itself
to state its contractual nature.10 1 For example, in Reynolds v. Estate of
Benefield,10 2 Wife died with a will leaving her entire estate to Son. Nieces
and Nephews of Wife's predeceased Husband contested the will on a va-
riety of grounds. In addition, they asserted that Wife and Husband had
an understanding that upon the death of the survivor, the estate would be
split into two equal shares, one for Son and the other for Nieces and
Nephews. Neither Husband's 1977 will nor Wife's 1996 or 1997 wills
made mention of a contract or understanding. However, Husband's will
and Wife's 1996 will did provide for Nieces and Nephews. The trial court
found that a contract existed and that Wife's 1997 will breached the
agreement.
The appellate court reversed. 10 3 The court first recognized that Texas
Probate Code § 59A, which requires a contractual will to expressly recite
that a contract exists and set out its material provisions, did not apply
because Husband's will was executed before September 1, 1979.104 The
court carefully examined the evidence and found it insufficient to support
a jury finding of a contractual will even under pre-§ 59A law.105 Hus-
band's 1977 will left his entire estate to Wife in fee simple without any
indication that it was other than an absolute and unconditional gift. Wife
did not execute a similar will in 1977. In fact, her somewhat similar will
was not signed until 1996. Although Wife's 1996 will did provide for
Nieces and Nephews, it was not in exactly the same manner as Husband's
will. The court determined that the oral statements of Nieces and Neph-
ews that there was some type of understanding between Husband and
Wife were also too weak to establish a contract.10 6
98. See In re Estate of Wilson, 7 S.W.3d at 171.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59A (Vernon 1980) (requiring contractual wills exe-
cuted on or after September 1, 1979 to state that the contract exists and the material terms
of that contract).
102. 995 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, pet. denied).
103. See id. at 886.
104. See id. at 888, n.5.






In re Estate of Foster'0 7 demonstrates the well-established principle
that in terrorem clauses will be strictly construed to avoid forfeiture if at
all possible. Child One and Child Two applied for the probate of
Mother's 1993 will. In the alternative, they requested that an earlier will
in which they receive a smaller share of the estate be admitted to probate.
Child Three claimed that this filing of an application to probate alterna-
tive wills was a will contest and thus triggered the forfeiture of the prop-
erty left to Child One and Child Two. The trial court rejected Child
Three's claim.
The appellate court affirmed. 0 8 The application to probate the 1993
will alleged that this will was a "valid" will. The earlier will was to be
probated only if the court found that the 1993 will was invalid. The court
determined that Child One and Child Two did not contest the will.10 9
Note, however, that the court did review a statement by Child One that
he did not think Mother understood the will because she could not read it
due to impaired eyesight."10 Accordingly, a will beneficiary should be
extremely careful not to take any action or make any statement which
could support a claim that the beneficiary is contesting the will.
True Property Owners
True owners of property are not barred by the will contest statute of
limitations"' from claiming that certain property did not belong to the
testator and thus is not part of the testator's probate estate. For example,
in Dickson v. Dickson," 2 Testator's will left certain land to Wife. Son
claimed prior ownership on the basis of adverse possession or parol gift.
The trial court granted Wife's motion for summary judgment deciding
that Son's holding was not hostile and that Son's claim of a parol gift was
barred by the statute of limitations for contesting a will.
The appellate court reversed.' 13 The court first held that there was
conflicting evidence regarding whether Son's taking was hostile and thus
summary judgment was inappropriate." 4 Next, the court determined
that the two year statute of limitations did not apply because Son was not
contesting the validity of Testator's will.1 5 Instead, Son was claiming
that certain property belonged to him and was not in the Testator's estate
in the first place. The court employed a humorous analogy: "[T]he will
possibly could have devised the father's interest, if any, in the Astrodome
at the time of his death. Would the actual owners of the Astrodome be
107. 3 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
108. See id. at 51.
109. See id. at 52.
110. See id. at 53.
111. See TEx. PROI3. CODE ANN. § 93 (Vernon 1980).
112. 993 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
113. See id. at 736.
114. See id. at 739.
115. See id. at 740.
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barred from asserting their ownership interest because of section 93? We
think not. '116
7. Settlement Agreements
Family settlements are often a wise choice for resolving estate disputes.
Before signing a family settlement agreement, each party must make cer-
tain that he or she is satisfied with its provisions because it will be difficult
to set aside in a subsequent action. In addition, the terms of any agree-
ment containing notations, interlineations, and the like should be retyped
prior to execution. The problems which may result if these simple steps
are not followed are reflected in Crossley v. Staley.117 Children entered
into a settlement agreement regarding Father's estate. Each child signed
the document which contained numerous handwritten additions and revi-
sions. Many months later, Daughters faxed a message to Son's attorney
stating that they would commence a lawsuit against him unless he agreed
to restructure his consideration under the settlement agreement. There-
after, Son obtained a summary judgment that the settlement agreement,
including the handwritten interlineations, was valid.
The appellate court affirmed. 118 The court first resolved a jurisdic-
tional issue by determining that the trial court had the authority to ascer-
tain the validity of the settlement agreement. 119 Next, the court focused
on the agreement itself.
Family settlement agreements of estate matters are highly favored by
Texas courts. They will not be disturbed for any ordinary mistake
either of law or fact and will be upheld where all parties have the
same knowledge or means of obtaining knowledge and there is no
fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, or conduct otherwise inequi-
table on the part of another party .... A unilateral mistake of law
by one party to a family settlement agreement will not support an
avoidance of the agreement. 120
The court then addressed and rejected Daughters' claim that the suit
for a declaratory judgment deprived them of their choice of forum to
assert tort claims. 12' The facts demonstrated that the suit was for a judi-
cial determination of rights under the written settlement agreement, not
an action to preemptively file for a declaration of nonliability of potential
tort claims. 122 The court concluded its analysis by holding that the trial
court's determination that it had venue was proper because, for example,
many provisions of the settlement agreement involved a partnership
116. Id.
117. 988 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
118. See id. at 792.
119. See id. at 796 (relying on TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004 (Vernon
1997) which authorizes a person interested under a written contract to seek a determina-
tion of the validity of the instrument).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 797.
122. See Crossley, 988 S.W.2d at 747.
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which had its principal office in the county.123
Res Judicata
A will contestant must make the best case possible the first time the
validity of the decedent's will is litigated. If the contestant fails, subse-
quent actions by others who also stand to benefit from the will's invalidity
may be barred by res judicata as in the case of In re Estate of Ayala.' 24
The trial court admitted Testator's will to probate. Wife and Son con-
tested. They lost at both the trial and appellate levels. Testator's three
other children then filed a new action to contest the will. The trial court
granted summary judgment against these children holding that their
claims were barred by res judicata.
The appellate court affirmed.125 Son contested Testator's will in the
first action and was in a position identical to that of the three children
who brought the new action. 126 Because these children stood in privity
with parties to the original will contest, their subsequent claim to invali-




Smith v. Lanier128 demonstrates that the jurisdiction of a Texas court
over the property of a Texas decedent is not easily defeated by a person
simply transferring the property out of Texas before another claimant has
the opportunity to prevent the transfer. Wife died in Texas and her will
was admitted to probate. Wife's will left her entire estate to Charity and
appointed Executor to administer the estate. Daughter, Husband's child
from a prior marriage, used a power of attorney she had previously ob-
tained from Husband and began gathering Husband's assets. Daughter
then moved Husband to South Carolina and continued to gather his as-
sets and move them to South Carolina. Husband died within a few weeks
of the move. Husband's will was admitted to probate in South Carolina.
The will named Daughter as the sole beneficiary and the executor. In the
inventory of Husband's estate, Daughter named Husband as the sole
owner of the property she had transferred from Texas. Executor began
proceedings in Texas to halt the probate process in South Carolina to
protect Charity. For example, Executor requested a determination of the
community or separate nature of the assets and a temporary restraining
order to prevent Daughter from removing property from Texas. Daugh-
ter objected to the Texas court's personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
The probate court held that it did have jurisdiction and issued an injunc-
123. See id. at 798.
124. 986 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
125. See id. at 725.
126. See id. at 727.
127. See id.
128. 998 S.W.2d 324 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
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tion requiring Daughter to deposit half of the assets she had transferred
to South Carolina with the Texas probate court until the court could
make a characterization of the property. Daughter appealed.
The appellate court affirmed.12 9 The court first determined that it had
in rem jurisdiction. 130 Daughter argued that all the property she removed
from Texas was Husband's separate property and thus there was a lack of
the minimum contacts necessary to obtain in rem jurisdiction. The court
held that there were sufficient contacts.13' The court stressed that the
property involved in the case was held in Texas during the marriage of
two Texas residents and was subject to probate proceedings following the
death in Texas of a Texas resident. 132 The court also explained that
Daughter cannot make a determination that the property was separate.133
Texas law presumes that property held during marriage is community so
Daughter has the burden of proving that the property was actually Hus-
band's separate property. 34 The court also rejected the argument that
the Texas court lost its in rem jurisdiction when the property left Texas
because the removal from Texas was not court authorized; Daughter's
unilateral transfer of the property to South Carolina did not defeat Texas
jurisdiction. 135
The court then determined that it had personal jurisdiction over
Daughter as the Executor of Husband's estate. 36 The court stated that
because the Texas probate court had in rem jurisdiction to the extent of
having the authority to characterize the couple's property at the time of
Wife's death, the court has jurisdiction over Daughter as representative
of Husband's estate. 137
The court next decided that it had personal jurisdiction over Daughter
as an individual. 138 The court provided an extensive list of transactions
Daughter conducted in Texas relating to Husband's property which were
sufficient to support the trial court's finding of personal jurisdiction.139
The court also rejected Daughter's claim that she was shielded from per-
sonal jurisdiction because most of her acts in Texas were as an agent for
Husband under his power of attorney. 140 "An agency relationship does
not shield an individual from jurisdictional contacts with a state, only
from possible liability flowing from the activities conducted within the
forum state."' 141
129. See id. at 328.
130. See id. at 331.
131. See id. at 332.
132. See id. at 331.
133. See Smith, 988 S.W.2d at 332.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 333.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See Smith, 988 S.W.2d at 334-35.
139. See id. at 334.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 334-35.
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The court determined that it had subject matter jurisdiction even
though the property had been transferred to South Carolina and was sub-
ject to an ongoing probate proceeding in that state.142 The Texas pro-
ceeding was initiated first and thus the property was already encumbered
by the exercise of the Texas probate court's subject matter jurisdiction. 143
Finally, the court determined that the trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion when it declined to exercise the principle of comity and defer its
subject matter jurisdiction to the South Carolina court. 144 The Texas
court only required one-half of the property to be returned, that is, the
maximum amount which could have been Wife's community property
share.145
Survival Action
Potential heirs and beneficiaries who think that the decedent has an
action that survives should make certain that they get a personal repre-
sentative appointed in a timely fashion and have that person bring the
survival action before the statute of limitations expires. The case of Ford
Motor Co. v. Cammack 46 shows the problems that are caused by delay.
Parents brought a survival action against Company alleging that Com-
pany's negligence caused the death of Daughter. The trial court found in
Parents' favor. Company appeals on various grounds including that Par-
ents lacked standing to bring the survival action because they were not
appointed by the court as Daughter's personal representatives. The ap-
pellate court agreed and reversed.' 47
The court began its discussion with a brief history of survival causes of
action. At common law, an individual's action for personal injuries did
not survive the person's death.' 48 However, the Texas legislature abro-
gated this rule in section 71.021 of the Civil Practices and Remedies
Code. 149 The personal representative of the decedent's estate is normally
the only person who is entitled to recover estate property. 150 However,
there are circumstances where an heir may have standing to bring suit on
behalf of the decedent's estate.151 "Heirs at law can maintain a survival
suit during the four year period the law allows for instituting administra-
tion proceedings if they allege and prove that there is no administration
pending and that none is necessary.' 52 Parents assert that Company
waived the issue by failing to timely file a verified plea in abatement in
the trial court.
142. See id. at 335.
143. See Smith, 988 S.W.2d at 335.
144. See id. at 336,
145. See id. at n.10.
146. 999 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
147. See id. at 3. This summary does not discuss the wrongful death judgment which
was affirmed.
148. See id. at 4.
149. See id.
150. See id.




The court held that Company did not waive the error because Com-
pany is claiming a lack of jurisdiction.153 Parents did not offer any proof
that Daughter died intestate and that Parents were her rightful heirs.
Likewise, if she died testate, Parent's did not prove they were the legal
representatives of her estate. In addition, Parents did not prove Daugh-
ter's estate owed no debts and that consequently no administration was
needed. The court concluded that Parents lacked standing and that the
survival claim is now barred by the statute of limitations.
154
Transfer to District Court
In Herbst v. Sheppard,155 Siblings presented a claim against Brother's
estate seeking compensation for care they provided Brother during the
last years of his life. Executor denied the claim. Claimants then sued in
the county court in which the administration was pending. The court
transferred the case under Texas Probate Code section 5(b) on its own
motion to the district court, sitting as a probate court. Executor claimed
that the district court was without jurisdiction to hear the case. The ap-
pellate court held that the court did have jurisdiction.156
Executor contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
case because the estate was being independently administered resulting in
jurisdiction being proper only in a district court under Texas Probate
Code section 145(h). Although the case was in district court, the district
court was actually sitting as a probate court. Consequently, Executor
claimed that because the estate was under the control of an independent
executor, the district court sitting as a probate court lacked jurisdiction.
The court declined to follow Carroll v. Carroll,157 and held that Texas
Probate Code section 145(h) only prohibits further action in the county
court, not the district court.' 58 The court believed this was consistent
with Texas Probate Code section 5A which defines "incident to an estate"
with respect to actions in district courts as including all claims against an
estate. 159
Child Support
A person seeking to recover child support arrearages or to modify a
child support arrangement should first go to the court which granted the
divorce and obtain a judgment. The person may then present this judg-
ment to the estate for payment just like any other debt. The importance
of following this procedure is reflected in Fleming v. Easton. 60 Testator's
divorce decree provided that the provisions for child support would not
terminate upon Testator's death but would instead become an obligation
of the estate. After Testator's death, Ex-Spouse filed a motion to confirm
153. See id.
154. See id. at 6.
155. 995 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).
156. See id. at 314.
157. 893 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
158. See Herbst, 995 S.W.2d at 313-14.
159. See id. at 313.
160. 998 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.).
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child support arrearages and to modify the divorce decree in the county
court which had admitted Testator's will to probate. The motion sought a
judgment for accrued but unpaid child support as well as to modify the
divorce decree so that Ex-Spouse could obtain a lump sum payment for
all future child support that would be owed by Testator's estate. The
court awarded the child support arrearages but refused to make the lump
sum award. Ex-Spouse appealed.
The appellate court held that the county court lacked jurisdiction to
make both arrearages and lump sum awards. 161 The court rejected Ex-
Spouse's claim that Texas Probate Code section 5A encompassed these
claims against Testator's estate.162 The court explained that jurisdiction
over these claims had already vested in the district court that had signed
the divorce decree. 163 Texas Family Code section 155.002 grants a trial
court which exercises domestic relations jurisdiction continuing and ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to a parent-child relation-
ship once the court renders a final judgment or order. 164 The court
distinguished In re Graham,65 in which the Supreme Court of Texas held
that the probate court was authorized to transfer to itself a non-final di-
vorce action. 166 The court also noted that nothing had occurred to divest
the district court of its jurisdiction. 67 Accordingly, the probate court has
no jurisdiction until these claims are reduced to judgment by the proper
court.168
Negligent Misrepresentation Claims
Estate of Arlitt v. Paterson169 shows that negligent misrepresentation
claims against a testator's estate planning attorney may be brought in the
probate court. Husband died leaving a 1983 will and a 1985 codicil which
substantially reduced the size of the Daughter's share, one of his four
children. Daughter contested the will and codicil. The contest dragged
on for many years. Wife, individually and as the executor of Husband's
estate, along with Other Children sued Attorneys who drafted the will
and codicil. They alleged that Attorneys represented Husband and Wife
jointly in preparing the estate plan and that they were negligent in so
doing. Attorneys responded that they were not liable for a variety of
reasons such as lack of privity, expiration of the statute of limitations, and
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted Attorneys' mo-
tion for summary judgment without specifying a reason.
The appellate court reversed holding that the statutory probate court
had subject matter jurisdiction over Wife and Other Children's claims be-
161. See id. at 254.
162. See id. at 255.
163. See id. at 254.
164. See id.
165. 971 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1998).
166. See Fleming, 998 S.W.2d at 254.
167. See id. at 255.
168. See id.
169. 995 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
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cause they are incident to Husband's estate under the 1985 version of the
Probate Code. 170 If they were successful on these claims, the action
would directly impact the assimilation of assets for the estate and conse-
quently, the statutory probate court had jurisdiction. 171
Compliance With Rules Required
Jurisdiction rules must be carefully followed, even if it may seem ineffi-
cient to do so. For example, in Burns v. Burns,172 Father died survived by
Son One, Son Two, and Daughter. Father's will named Son One and Son
Two as co-executors and provided for his estate to be divided equally
among his three children. Before the administration of Father's estate
was finished, Daughter died. Daughter's will named Son One and Son
Two as co-executors and, except for a few specific gifts, divided her estate
evenly between her two brothers.
Problems arose during the administration of Daughter's estate. Son
Two resigned and brought suit in the county court to have Son One re-
moved from office and to recover funds Son One allegedly misappropri-
ated from Daughter's estate. Using Texas Probate Code § 5(b), the
county court transferred the case to the district court and Son One re-
signed. The county court appointed a new executor and appointed an
auditor to review Daughter's estate. The auditor discovered that Son
One had overpaid himself from both Daughter's estate and assets still
held in Father's estate. Son One did not challenge the contents of the
report and consequently the district court entered summary judgment in
favor of Son Two and the new executor of Daughter's estate directing the
payment of certain funds to each.
Son One appealed asserting that the district court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction because part of Son Two's claim was incident to Father's
estate which was pending in another court. The appellate court began its
analysis by examining Son Two's standing to bring a claim on behalf of
Daughter's estate in the first place.' 73 Normally, a beneficiary lacks this
ability. 174 However, in this case, Son One would be highly unlikely to
bring suit against himself and thus Son Two had standing to bring the suit
on behalf of Daughter's estate.1 75 When the court appointed the new
executor, that person had standing to pursue the claim and Son Two was
divested of his standing 76
The court next examined the district court's ability to resolve issues
regarding the funds in Father's estate. The court in which the probate of
Father's estate was pending had dominant jurisdiction over the claims re-
170. See id. at 718. Although this case is based on the 1985 version of the Texas Probate
Code, the same result is likely under the Probate Code in its current formulation.
171. See id.
172. 2 S.W.3d 339 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
173. See id. at 342-43.
174. See id. at 342.
175. See id. at 342-43 (citing Chandler v. Welborn, 294 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1956)).
176. See Burns, 2 S.W.3d at 343.
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lating to the accounts involving Father's property.177 Accordingly, it was
improper for the district court involved with Daughter's estate to exercise
jurisdiction over these claims. 178 These claims are incident to Father's
estate and need to be brought in that action under Texas Probate Code
section 5A(b). 179 The court thus dismissed without prejudice the district
court's judgment as it related to accounts involved with Father's estate.180
The court recognized that its finding would cause Son Two and the execu-
tor to relitigate many of the same claims in two courts.181 The court was
sympathetic but realized it had no choice because no single court had
sufficient jurisdiction to adjudicate all the claims. 182 "[J]udicial economy
cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction."'' 83
Finally, the court reversed the summary judgment with regard to the
funds Son One allegedly improperly distributed from Daughter's es-
tate.' 84 Although the evidence was enough to support a finding that the
distributions were disproportionate, it did not establish as a matter of law
that they were wrongful.' 85
2. Transfer
In re Kenedy Foundation186 explains that district courts cannot take ad-
vantage of the transfer and consolidation powers granted to statutory
probate courts under Texas Probate Code section 5B. Heirs filed an ap-
plication to determine heirship of an intestate decedent who had died in
the 1800s. The case was filed in a county court in Zapata County and
later transferred to district court in Zapata County which issued several
judgments declaring various individuals to be the heirs. The Kenedy
Foundation subsequently filed a declaratory judgment in Kenedy County
to establish itself as the owner of certain real property potentially subject
to the claims of these heirs. The heirs filed petitions in Zapata County to
be declared the owners of the Kenedy County land. In addition, they
asked the Zapata County district judge to transfer the Kenedy County
proceeding to Zapata County and to consolidate it. The judge granted
the motion to transfer and consolidate. The Kenedy Foundation then
sought a writ of mandamus from the appellate court to require the
Zapata County judge to vacate his order.
The appellate court conditionally granted the writ. 187 The heirs claim
that the judge's transfer order was proper under Texas Probate Code sec-
tion 5B which permits the judge of a statutory probate court to transfer to




181. See id. at 344-45.
182. See Burns, 2 S.W.3d at 344-45.
183. Id. at 345 n.6.
184. See id. at 346.
185. See id. at 345-46.
186. 982 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
187. See id. at 549.
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the court certain actions appertaining to or incident to the estate. How-
ever, the Zapata County district court is not a statutory probate court
and, thus, section 5B does not authorize the transfer. 188 A district court
cannot qualify as a statutory probate court because it is not a statutory
court; instead, it is a constitutional court. 189
3. Application to Probate Multiple Wills
Filing several wills for probate in the alternative may further the public
policies of promoting judicial economy, avoiding a multiplicity of actions,
and encouraging resolutions in one proceeding. For example, in In re
Estate of Foster,190 Child One and Child Two applied for the probate of
Mother's 1993 will. In the alternative, they requested that an earlier will
in which they receive a smaller share of the estate be admitted to probate.
Child Three claimed that this filing of an application to probate alterna-
tive wills was not authorized under Texas Probate Code sections 81 and
83. The trial court rejected Child Three's claim.
The appellate court affirmed.1 91 Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 48 ex-
pressly provides that a party may set forth two or more claims in the
alternative.192 The Probate Code does not prohibit "the filing of two or
more wills for probate, alternatively, in one application.' 1 93
4. Personal Representative Appointment
In re Estate of Crenshaw194 serves as a reminder that it is essential to
comply with the technicalities of the Rules of Civil Procedure when liti-
gating estate issues. Failure to do so may result in additional delays and
increased expense. Executor named in Testatrix's will filed an application
to probate the will and for letters testamentary. In the application, Exec-
utor described himself as "the" surviving son although in actuality at least
one other son also survived. One of the other sons moved for a continu-
ance on the ground that Rule 245 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
entitled him to at least a forty-five day notice before the first trial setting.
The trial court denied the motion and appointed Executor.
The appellate court reversed and held that the other son was entitled to
the forty-five day notice. 195 Executor attempted to circumvent the forty-
five day period by claiming that Testatrix's power to select her executor is
absolute. The court dispatched this argument by pointing out that Texas
Probate Code section 78 prevents a wide variety of persons from serving
as the executor.196 The court also noted that there were potentially valid
188. See id. at 550-51.
189. See id.
190. 3 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
191. See id. at 56.
192. See id. at 52.
193. Id.
194. 982 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.).




reasons for disqualifying Executor from serving, such as a conflict of in-
terest, demonstrating that the court's function in appointing the personal
representative is not merely ministerial. 197 As a final argument, Executor
claimed that a controversy involving the appointment of a personal repre-
sentative is not worthy of a full adversarial trial. The court rejected this
claim by pointing to Texas Probate Code section 10 which provides that
an interested person may file opposition to any issue and is entitled to be
heard just like in other suits.198
5. Suitability of Executor
As In re Estate of Foster1 99 indicates, substantial evidence is needed to
show that the executors named in a will are unsuitable for the position.
Child One and Child Two applied for the probate of Mother's will and
were appointed as executors. Child Three claimed that the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that they were not unsuitable
executors.
The appellate court rejected Child Three's claim.200 Child One and
Child Two were the named executors in Mother's will. Mother named
Child Three as the alternate executor. Child One and Child Two were
also serving as the executors for Father's estate and Child Three asserted
that they were neglectful in performing their duties with respect to Fa-
ther's estate. Child Three also claimed that they were in a conflict of
interest situation because they may owe money to the estate as well as be
entitled to distributions from the estate. The court reviewed this and
other evidence and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in determining that Child One and Child Two were not unsuitable. 201
6. Receivers
A personal representative should think very carefully before seeking
the appointment of a receiver to perform an act which the personal repre-
sentative could do on his or her own initiative. The hassles of imposing
additional legal procedures may outweigh any potential benefit. In the
case of In re Estate of Herring,202 Husband and Wife purchased a tract of
land which became community property. After Wife died, this land was
subject to the payment of community debts and the right of the adminis-
trator to possess and control the land during the administration process
under Texas Probate Code section 177(b). "[W]hile under the jurisdic-
tion of the probate court, all community property, including the half-in-
terest of the surviving spouse, is subject to administration and sale by the
probate court as a part of the estate of the deceased spouse. ''203 The
197. See id.
198. See id. at 570-71.
199. 3 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
200. See id. at 54.
201. See id. at 54-56.
202. 983 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.).
203. Id. at 63.
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court authorized the administrator to sell this land and convey the entire
community interest to a third party. "There is no additional requirement
for the holder of a community interest in the property to join in the deed,
any more than the beneficiaries of the decedent's estate are required to
join in such a conveyance. '2 0 4 Nonetheless, the trial court ordered Hus-
band to sign the deed. When Husband refused, the administrator sought
the appointment of a receiver to complete the sale and convey the land.
The trial court appointed the receiver and Husband appealed.
The appellate court affirmed and rejected a variety of Husband's com-
plaints about the appointment of a receiver. 205 Husband complained that
the administrator failed to post an applicant's bond under Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 695a. Although Texas Probate Code section 12(c) ex-
cuses the administrator from posting "security for costs" in any suit
brought in a fiduciary capacity, this section would not excuse the bond
because it secures payment of a variety of damages, not just costs. 20 6
Nonetheless, the court viewed this appointment of a receiver as, in real-
ity, a request for turnover relief under Civil Practice and Remedies Code
section 31.002(b)(3), which provides that the decision whether to require
a bond is within the discretion of the trial court.207 Accordingly, the
court held that the bonding requirements of Rule 695a did not apply. 20 8
The court also rejected Husband's claim that there were no pleadings
or evidence to support the appointment of a receiver. 20 9 The court deter-
mined that the trial court had the discretion to appoint a receiver to carry
out the order of sale.210 The court could not determine how Husband
could be harmed by the appointment of a receiver since the administrator
had full authority to sell the property without Husband's consent.21' Fi-
nally, the court rejected Husband's assertion that the probate court
should have abated the order until Husband's separate claims of fraud on
the community were resolved.212 The existence of these claims did not
"deprive the trial court of its ability to carry out the [] order of sale."2 13
7. Creditors Claims
Spousal Support Agreement
An agreement incident to divorce which provides for periodic pay-
ments should expressly state whether the obligation to pay continues af-
ter the death of the obligor to reduce the likelihood of litigation if the
obligor dies prior to making all of the payments. The importance of tak-
204. Id.
205. See id. at 65.
206. See id. at 64.
207. See id.








ing this precaution is highlighted in Cardwell v. Sicola-Cardwell.214 Hus-
band and Wife entered into an agreement incident to their divorce which
provided for Husband to pay Wife support until Husband made 300 pay-
ments or Wife died, whichever occurred first. Husband died after making
148 payments. Wife filed suit against Husband's estate for the remainder
of the payments. The trial court rejected Wife's claim. The appellate
court reversed.215
The court began its analysis with a review of the law regarding con-
tract-based alimony and how this type of alimony, unlike court-ordered
alimony, has had a long history of judicial support.216 The court then
decided that contract law governs the determination of whether Hus-
band's duty to pay continues after his death.2 17 Under general principles
of contract law, an obligation survives the death of a party and binds the
party's "estate if the contract is capable of being performed by the estate
representative. ' 218 The court rejected the claim that the contract was one
for personal services and thus could be performed only by Husband.219
This contract merely provided for the payment of money, which is an act
the personal representative can easily perform.220 "The amount owed is
merely a debt with no distinctively personal characteristics. 2 21 Accord-
ingly, the court ordered that Wife recover the present value of the re-
maining payments.222
Care Services
A person providing care services who wants to be paid for rendering
the services should memorialize the agreement in writing. Failure to do
so may raise problems such as those found in Herbst v. Sheppard.22 3 Sib-
lings presented a claim against Brother's estate seeking compensation for
care they provided Brother during the last years of his life. Executor
denied the claim which was based on breach of express contract and
quantum meruit. Claimants then sued in the county court in which the
administration was pending. The court transferred the case to the district
court which granted Executor's claim for summary judgment. The appel-
late court affirmed.224
The court reviewed the evidence and held that there was no evidence
of an express agreement between Siblings and Brother to compensate
Siblings for their care services.225 Likewise, the court held that there was
insufficient evidence to support a claim for quantum meruit because
214. 978 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
215. See id. at 724.
216. See id. at 725.
217. See id. at 726.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 726-27.
220. See Cardwell, 978 S.W.2d at 726.
221. Id.
222. See id. at 728.
223. 995 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied).
224. See id. at 312.
225. See id. at 314.
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there was no evidence that Brother was reasonably notified that Siblings
expected Brother to pay them additional sums for their services over the
amount he had already paid to them for expenses.226
Fraud and Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Cross v. Old Republic Surety Co. 22 7 reminds estate creditors of the im-
portance of determining whether their claims are liquidated or unliqui-
dated and then complying with all the technical requirements of the Texas
Probate Code. Administrator qualified as the personal representative of
Decedent's estate and filed a surety bond issued by Bonding Company
conditioned upon Administrator "well and truly, faithfully perform[ing]
all the duties required of him. ' 228 Administrator and Decedent had en-
gaged in various acts of wrongful conduct in which they defrauded Dece-
dent's sister (Administrator's aunt) ("Aunt"). Administrator first placed
the money in Decedent's name and, after her death, in the name of her
estate. He then distributed it to himself as Decedent's sole heir. Aunt's
temporary conservator ("Conservator") sought to recover from Bonding
Company on Administrator's bond. The probate court found in favor of
Bonding Company because Conservator had not followed the Probate
Code procedures for claims against Administrator.
The appellate court reversed.229 The claims procedures in the Probate
Code apply to liquidated claims.230 However, Conservator's claim for
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against Administrator were unliqui-
dated until the court issued a judgment.231 Likewise, Conservator's claim
against Bonding Company was unliquidated and the procedures for liqui-
dated claims, such as making a presentment prior to suit, did not apply.232
The court then held that the probate court erred in refusing to render
judgment in Conservator's favor because the undisputed evidence conclu-
sively established his right to recover against Bonding Company.2 33 The
evidence showed that Administrator breached his duties in a variety of
ways thus triggering Bonding Company's liability on the bond.234 The
court rejected Bonding Company's argument that Conservator did not
follow the procedures in Texas Probate Code sections 326 and 328 to seek
an order of payment and then if payment is not made, to obtain a judg-
ment against the administrator and the surety. 235 A creditor does not
have to comply with these procedures when the estate does not have suf-
ficient funds on-hand to pay the claim.236
226. See id. at 315.
227. 983 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied).
228. Id. at 773.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 774.
231. See id. at 775.
232. See id. at 776.
233. See Cross, 983 S.W.2d at 778.





8. Muniment of Title
In Power v. Chapman,237 Wife's will was admitted to probate as a mu-
niment of title. Husband sued the executor named in the will for breach
of fiduciary duty. The court held that no fiduciary relationship arose be-
cause the named executor did not qualify as the executor of the estate.238
A named executor has no authority to deal with the estate and assumes
no fiduciary duties until that person is officially appointed by a court with
proper jurisdiction as the executor.
9. Homestead
A person asserting homestead rights should not voluntarily move out
of the home even if an heir or beneficiary insists that the person vacate
the premises as evidenced by Power v. Chapman.239 Prior to marriage,
Husband and Wife entered into a prenuptial agreement listing certain as-
sets as the separate property of each and indicating that these assets
would pass at death as if no marriage had taken place. Wife died with a
will leaving her entire estate to Son, a child from a previous relationship.
Husband lived in Wife's home until he remarried. Husband asked Son if
he could remain in the house with his new spouse but Son said no. Hus-
band moved out.
Husband asserts that he did not waive his homestead rights in the pre-
marital agreement because it did not expressly waive these rights. None-
theless, the court indicated that there was enough evidence to support a
finding that Husband abandoned his homestead rights when he volunta-
rily moved out of the home after his remarriage.2 40
10. Bill of Review
Power v. Chapman241 provides a valuable review of the law relating to
bills of review in probate matters. Prior to marriage, Husband and Wife
entered into a prenuptial agreement listing certain assets as the separate
property of each and indicating that these assets would pass at death as if
no marriage had taken place. Wife died. Wife's will predated the mar-
riage and left her entire estate to Son, her child from a previous marriage.
The court admitted this will to probate as a muniment of title in June
1991. Husband lived in Wife's home until he remarried in March 1992.
In January 1993, Husband learned that he had community property
rights and homestead rights in Wife's estate. Accordingly, in June 1994,
he filed a bill of review contending that the order admitting the will to
probate was improper because he did not receive notice and that this
notice failure deprived him of his rights in Wife's estate. Husband
claimed it was not his fault for not pursuing his claims earlier because he
237. 994 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
238. See id. at 336.
239. See id. at 335.
240. See id.
241. 994 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
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relied on Son's attorney who allegedly told him that he had no rights in
Wife's estate. Husband also brought claims against Son for fraud, conver-
sion, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court
granted the equitable bill of review and set the case for trial. Subse-
quently, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Son on all
claims which invoked the court's original jurisdiction and dismissed the
remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The appellate court affirmed by holding that neither a statutory nor an
equitable bill of review would provide Husband with a remedy. 242 The
court began by addressing the viability of a statutory bill of review under
Texas Probate Code section 31.243 A statutory bill of review must be filed
within two years of the allegedly erroneous order.244 Husband filed his
petition well outside of the two year period and thus Husband could not
use this section to gain the requested relief.
245
The court then looked at the ability of Husband to file an equitable bill
of review. To succeed on this theory, Husband must prove (1) a meritori-
ous defense which would have prevented the probating of the will as a
muniment of title, (2) that he could not make this defense because of
Son's fraud, accident, or wrongful act, (3) that his failure to do so was
without any fault or negligence of his own, and (4) that he did not fail to
pursue legal remedies which were available to him. 246 The court indi-
cated that even if Son and his attorney had acted improperly, Husband
had notice of his potential claims approximately six months before the
time period for bringing a statutory bill of review expired. 247 Accord-
ingly, Husband was not entitled to an equitable bill of review because he
failed to pursue his legal remedies. 248
11. Statute of Limitations
In Wallace v. Collins,249 Heir of a partial intestate decedent sued Exec-
utrix to recover a legacy, compel an inventory, require an accounting and
distribution, and remove Executrix. The trial court granted Executrix's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the statute of limita-
tions on Heir's claims had run.
The appellate court reversed on the ground that a genuine issue exists
as to the material fact of whether the estate is still open.250 If the estate is
still open, the trial court had jurisdiction to hear Heir's claims and they
would not be barred by the statute of limitations. 251 Even if the estate
242. See id. at 335.
243. See id. at 334.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See Power, 994 S.W.2d at 335.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. 988 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1998, pet. denied).
250. See id. at 261.
251. See id. at 260.
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was closed, Heir's claims were still timely (except the cause of action to
remove Executrix).252 Heir filed her claims within four years after the
two-year waiting period imposed by Texas Probate Code section 149B
before a person interested in the estate can petition a court for an ac-
counting and distribution.2 53 To clarify the status of the estate, indepen-
dent personal representatives should close the administration by affidavit
following the procedure in Texas Probate Code section 151. No issue
would then exist as to whether the administration is still pending.
D. TRUSTS
1. Creation
Bailey v. Bailey254 shows how courts are willing to extend trust con-
cepts to areas where trust law would initially not seem applicable. Pursu-
ant to a court order, Mother deposited $400 per month for child support
with the clerk of the court. The clerk was directed to pay $300 to Father
and $100 into a joint checking account for the general health, mainte-
nance, education, and welfare of Child. The order also provided that
when the duty to provide child support ended, the remaining funds would
be distributed to Child. The trial court awarded Child all the funds in the
account pursuant to this order and Father appealed.
The appellate court held that the trial court's award of the remaining
funds was proper.255 The court concluded that the transaction had the
elements of a trust.256 "[I]n ordering child support, the trial court is cre-
ating for all practical purposes a 'hybrid express' trust wherein the payor
is the trustor, the payee is the trustee, and the child is the beneficiary. '257
The court recognized that the child support arrangement was not a tradi-
tional trust.258 "But, because it involves an intent (though judicially ex-
pressed), a specific purpose (though judicially designated), and a specific
duration (though judicially set), it is much like an express trust. Thus, we
are compelled to treat it like an express trust. ' 259 Accordingly, the terms
of the trust mandated the distribution of the remaining funds to Child
and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by so ordering. 260
2. Substitute Fiduciary Act
Texas Commerce Bank National Association v. Wood 261 shows that
compliance with the Substitute Fiduciary Act will not prevent a class cer-
tification for Beneficiaries who allege the substitution was improper.
252. See id. at 261.
253. See id.
254. 987 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet.).
255. See id. at 211.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 211-12.
258. See id. at 212.
259. Id.
260. See id. at 212-13.
261. 994 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. dism'd).
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Bank purchased Trust Company and then formed four national banks.
Bank transferred trust accounts it had acquired from Trust Company to
these new banks. Bank notified Beneficiaries about the change and ad-
vised them that they could contest the transfer by filing a petition in the
appropriate court. Shortly thereafter, the new banks along with the
transferred accounts were sold to other entities. Beneficiaries filed a
class action against Bank alleging that the profits it earned from the
transfers belong to the trusts, not to Bank as trustee. The trial court certi-
fied Beneficiaries as a class. The appellate court affirmed the certifica-
tion.2 62 Bank appealed on a variety of grounds, including that it had fully
complied with the Substitute Fiduciary Act as contained in the Texas Fi-
nance Code, section 274.101 et seq.
The court rejected Bank's claim that the class certification was im-
proper because the transfers had complied with the Substitute Fiduciary
Act.2 63 "In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not
whether [Beneficiaries] have stated a cause of action or will prevail on
the merits, but rather whether the requirements of the class certification
rule have been met. '264
3. Termination
Sorrel v. Sorrel265 discusses the powers of the trustee when a trust ter-
minates. Three Sons were serving as trustees of Settlor's trust. Two years
after the trust terminated in favor of the Sons as remainder beneficiaries,
Son One brought suit against Son Two and Son Three complaining that
they had failed to wind up the trust and divide the trust property accord-
ing to the terms of the trust. He also alleged a variety of other improprie-
ties. The trial court ratified the trustees' actions since the termination of
the trust except for the trustees' attempted partition of the real property.
The court also declared that all real property belonging to the trust was
owned by the Sons as tenants in common.
The appellate court affirmed.2 66 The court determined that the Sons'
power as trustees to partition the trust's real property did not survive the
termination of the trust.267 "[O]nly those powers incidental to winding
up the trust survive termination and, as the partition of realty is not nec-
essary to closing the trust under the circumstances, the trustee could not
partition realty among the beneficiaries."2 6.8 The Texas Trust Code sec-
tion 112.052, permits the trustee to continue to exercise trust powers only
"for the reasonable period of time required to wind up the affairs of the
trust and to make distribution of its assets to the appropriate benefi-
262. See id. at 800.
263. See id. at 802.
264. Id.
265. 1 S.W.3d 867 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
266. See id. at 872.
267. See id. at 871-72.
268. Id. at 869.
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ciaries. ''269 Merely because the trustees had the power to partition assets
of the trust while the trust was in existence did not give the trustees that
power after trust termination.2 70
4. Enforcement
Statute of Limitations
Beneficiaries must promptly bring actions for breach of duty not just
when professional fiduciaries are involved, but also in situations where
family members are serving as fiduciaries for other family members. A
beneficiary cannot fail to bring an action in a timely manner and then
assert as a reason for the failure the beneficiary's desire to keep family
peace and avoid unpleasant confrontations. The case of Wright v. Green-
berg2 71 is instructive. Mother's will created a testamentary trust for
Daughter naming Father as trustee. After Father died twenty years later,
Daughter brought an action against Executor of his estate alleging that
Father mishandled trust property. Executor argued that Daughter's
claims are barred by the residual four-year statute of limitations con-
tained in section 16.051 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code.
Daughter urged that Executor was estopped to assert that limitations had
run. Daughter claimed that she had to show respect for her father and
rely on the information he supplied to her. She asserted that she relied
on statements Father made to her that she would be "a very rich girl" and
thus did not inquire into how trust property was being handled.272
Daughter also explained that Father would become upset if Daughter re-
quested too much information about the trust.
The appellate court held that these facts were insufficient to show that
Executor was equitably estopped to raise the statute of limitations.2 73
Simply stated, there was no evidence of any misrepresentation or con-
cealment of material facts.274 Statements of Father's opinion about the
future financial status of Daughter were not enough to create an
estoppel.2 75
The court then examined whether the statute of limitations barred
Daughter's action. Daughter asserted that Executor had the burden (1)
to prove when the cause of action accrued, and (2) to negate the discov-
ery rule. The court determined that the cause of action accrued approxi-
mately five years before Father's death.2 76 Father had resigned as trustee
and there was an extensive paper trail documenting the communications
between Father and Daughter regarding the trust. On appeal, Daughter
claimed that Executor failed to negate the discovery rule. But, Daughter
269. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.052 (Vernon 1995).
270. See Sorrel, 1 S.W.3d at 870-71.
271. 2 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
272. See id. at 674.
273. See id. at 675-76.
274. See id. at 675.
275. See id.
276. See id. at 676.
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failed to raise the discovery rule at trial and Executor has the burden of
negating the discovery rule only if it was plead or otherwise raised. The
court consequently affirmed the trial court's judgment that the statute of
limitations barred Daughter's breach of duty action.
277
Service of Process
In Price v. Dean,278 the trial court rendered a default judgment against
Trustee in her capacity as a trustee. The appellate court reversed on the
ground that the service was deficient because the return of service did not
indicate service in her capacity as a trustee.279 The court determined that
it did not matter that she knew about the lawsuit because "[a] default
judgment is improper against a defendant who has not been served in
strict compliance with the law, even if [she] has actual knowledge of the
lawsuit. '280 Likewise, it was irrelevant that the citation was in proper
form and did name Trustee in her representative capacity.
281
5. Foreign Trusts in Texas Courts
An out-of-state trust may be amenable to process in Texas if an agent
with authority to bind the trust contractually agrees for venue to be in
Texas. For example, in Bernice Claire Row Trust v. Throckmorton Land
& Cattle Co.,282 Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of a pasture agree-
ment. Plaintiff later learned that Defendant was not the owner of the
ranch although Defendant managed the ranches. Instead, the ranch was
owned by two Oklahoma trusts. The trusts maintained that Defendant
was not an agent of the trusts, but merely a tenant of the ranch. The trial
court rejected the trusts' argument and held that Defendant was an agent
of the trusts and had actual authority to bind the trusts on the pasture
agreement with Plaintiff.
The appellate court affirmed.2 83 The court concluded that there was
legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding
that Defendant had the actual and implied power to make the pasture
agreement.284 In addition, the trusts were amenable to process in Texas
because Defendant, their agent, had entered into a written agreement




An heir or beneficiary subject to a federal tax lien may not avoid that
277. See Wright, 2 S.W.3d at 677.
278. 990 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
279. See id. at 454.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 454-55.
282. 979 S.W.2d 383 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1998, no pet.).





liability by disclaiming estate property. In Drye v. United States,286 Heir
stood to inherit all of Intestate's estate and had many creditors including
the Federal Government, which had filed a tax lien on all of Heir's prop-
erty. Although Heir properly disclaimed his inheritance under state law
so that the property would pass to his daughter, the government claimed
that the disclaimer did not defeat the federal tax lien.
The Supreme Court of the United States sided with the government
and held that Heir's interest as an heir to Intestate's estate constituted
property (or a right to property) to which the federal tax lien attached
despite Heir's exercise of a state law giving him the right to disclaim the
interest retroactively. 287 State law determines the rights or interests held
by a person but federal law determines whether those rights or interests
are property or rights to property within the meaning of the federal tax
lien statutes.288
2. Joint Account
The surviving co-signer on a bank account in Pressler v. Lytle State
Bank289 claimed that the account had survivorship rights. However, the
account signature card had conflicting designations. The box next to the
language creating the survivorship feature was marked with an "x" in
blue ink while the box next to the individual account designation was
marked by a typewriter, just like the rest of the card. The jury found that
the blue ink "x" was not placed on the card by the owner of the account
or with his consent. Consequently, the trial court ordered the surviving
co-signer who had withdrawn the funds from the account to return the
funds to the owner's estate as well as to pay the estate's attorney fees and
costs. The surviving co-signer appealed contending that she inappropri-
ately had the burden of proving that the blue "x" was placed on the ac-
count by the owner or with his consent. In addition, she claimed that the
jury's finding was not supported by the evidence.
The appellate court rejected the co-signer's claims and affirmed the
trial court's holding that the account did not grant the co-signer survivor-
ship rights.290 The court, following Texas Probate Code section 439(a)
and prior cases, concluded that "a party who claims to own an account as
the survivor of a joint account with right of survivorship bears the burden
of proving her claim."' 291 The court then reviewed the evidence and
found that there was ample evidence to support the jury's finding that the
owner of the account did not place the blue "x" in the survivorship box
286. 120 S. Ct. 474 (1999).
287. See id. at 483.
288. See id. at 481. Drye effectively overrules Leggett v. United States, 120 F.3d 592(5th Cir. 1997), which held that the federal tax lien did not attach to the disclaimed
property.
289. 982 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
290. See id. at 563.
291. Id. at 564.
1266 [Vol. 53
PROBATE AND TRUSTS
and that it was not placed there with his consent. 292
3. Negligent Misrepresentation
Texas courts recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation as de-
scribed by section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.293 The ele-
ments for this cause of action are:
(1) the representation is made by a defendant in the course of his
business, or in a transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest; (2)
the defendant supplies 'false information' for the guidance of others
in their business; (3) the defendant did not exercise reasonable care
or competence in obtaining or communicating the information; and
(4) the plaintiff suffers pecuniary loss by justifiably relying on the
representation. 294
In 1999, the Supreme Court of Texas held in the case of McCamish,
Martin, Brown & Loeffler v. FE. Appling Interests,2 95 that attorneys, just
like other professionals, could incur liability for negligent misrepresenta-
tion. The court explained that
a negligent misrepresentation claim is not equivalent to a legal mal-
practice claim. Under the tort of negligent misrepresentation, liabil-
ity is not based on the breach of duty a professional owes his or her
clients or others in privity, but on an independent duty to the non-
client based on the professional's manifest awareness of the non-
client's reliance on the misrepresentation and the professional's
intention that the nonclient so rely. Therefore, an attorney can be
subject to a negligent misrepresentation claim in a case in which she
is not subject to a legal malpractice claim. The theory of negligent
misrepresentation permits plaintiffs who are not parties to a contract
for professional services to recover from the contracting
professionals. 296
The recent case of Estate of Arlitt v. Paterson297 appears to be the first
case discussing negligent misrepresentation in a will drafting context.
Husband died leaving a 1983 will and a 1985 codicil which substantially
reduced the size of the share of Daughter, one of his four children.
Daughter contested the will and codicil in a contest that dragged on for
many years. Wife, individually and as the executor of Husband's will,
along with Other Children sued Attorneys who drafted the will and codi-
cil. They alleged that Attorneys represented Husband and Wife jointly in
preparing the estate plan and that they were negligent in so doing. Attor-
neys responded that they were not liable for a variety of reasons such as
lack of privity, expiration of the period of limitations, and lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted Attorneys' motion for sum-
mary judgment without specifying a reason. The appellate court
292. See id. at 565.
293. See Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991).
294. Id. at 442.
295. 991 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1999).
296. Id. at 792 (citations omitted).




The appellate court recognized that a plaintiff must show privity to pre-
vail on a legal malpractice claim,299 but that privity is not needed to es-
tablish a duty not to negligently misrepresent. 300 The court explained
that a negligent misrepresentation claim is not the same as a malpractice
claim and that an attorney may be subject to a negligent misrepresenta-
tion claim even though the attorney is not subject to a malpractice
claim.301 The appellate court remanded these claims because Attorneys'
motion did not address the negligent misrepresentation claims and held




Attorneys and beneficiaries may act with regard to each other to such
an extent that an attorney-client relationship actually arises which elimi-
nates the protection granted in the Barcelo30 3 case. For example, in Es-
tate of Arlitt v. Paterson,30 4 Husband died leaving a 1983 will and a 1985
codicil which substantially reduced the size of the share of Daughter, one
of his four children. Daughter contested the will and codicil in a contest
that dragged on for many years. Wife, individually and as the executor of
Husband's will, along with Other Children sued Attorneys who drafted
the will and codicil. They alleged that Attorneys represented Husband
and Wife jointly in preparing the estate plan and that they were negligent
in so doing. Attorneys responded that they were not liable for a variety
of reasons such as lack of privity, expiration of the period of limitations,
and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted Attorneys'
motion for summary judgment without specifying a reason. The appellate
court reversed.305
The appellate court began its malpractice discussion by holding that the
two year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims may not have
expired because it does not begin to run until Wife and Other Children
discover or reasonably should have discovered the wrongfully caused in-
jury.306 Attorneys had failed to conclusively prove that Wife and Other
Children filed their malpractice claims more than two years after they
discovered or reasonably should have discovered the wrongfully caused
injury. 30 7 Thus, the trial court improperly granted Attorneys' motion for
298. See id. at 716.




303. See Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
304. 995 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
305. See id. at 716.





The court then focused on privity. The court recognized that in
Barcelo, the Supreme Court of Texas held that "an attorney retained by a
testator or settlor to draft a will or trust owes no professional duty of care
to persons named as beneficiaries under the will or trust. '30 9 The court
concluded that Wife and Other Children must establish that they were in
privity of contract with Attorneys to move forward with a malpractice
claim.310 With regard to Other Children, the court held that there was no
evidence that Husband was acting as Other Children's agent when he
consulted with Attorney and there was no evidence that Attorneys repre-
sented Other Children. 311 Thus, summary judgment denying these claims
was affirmed.312 Likewise, summary judgment was proper against Wife in
her capacity as Husband's executor.313
The court next examined Wife's personal claim for malpractice. Wife
claimed that privity existed between Wife and Attorneys because they
jointly represented Wife and Husband in the estate planning process. On
the other hand, Attorneys argued that they represented only Husband
and thus there was no privity. The court determined that Barcelo would
not prevent Wife's personal claim because she could qualify as a repre-
sented beneficiary. 314 "The Barcelo rule thus does not deny a cause of
action to one of two joint clients. ''315 Accordingly, the trial court's sum-
mary judgment against Wife personally was improper because there is a
material issue of fact as to whether Attorneys represented Wife as well as
Husband.316
Lack of Tax Savings Provisions
In Guest v. Cochran,317 Parents hired Attorney who was a close friend
of Preferred Child. Slighted Children alleged that Attorney conspired
with Preferred Child so that Preferred Child would obtain a dispropor-
tionate amount of Parents' estates via an irrevocable inter vivos trust and
other non-probate arrangements. Parents, however, never signed these
instruments. The wills did not contain bypass trusts to save estate taxes
on the unified credit amount. In addition, Attorney did not advise the
Surviving Spouse or the executors of Deceased Spouse's estate that Sur-
viving Spouse could disclaim a portion of the estate to reduce the size of
her estate which would be subject to the estate tax upon her death. As a
result, the estate of the second parent to die paid $60,000 in estate taxes.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Attorney.
308. See id.
309. Id. at 720 (quoting Barcelo v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. 1996)).




314. See id. at 721.
315. Id.
316. See Estate of Arlitt, 995 S.W.2d at 721.
317. 993 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
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The appellate court affirmed the summary judgment on Slighted Chil-
dren's individual claims against Attorney for malpractice following
Barcelo.318 The court rejected the argument that Barcelo was bad law
and that the lower court should decide differently because of the ever
changing landscape of Texas law.319 The Barcelo shield protecting negli-
gent attorneys from liability for their estate planning errors continues to
hold. It is unlikely that a lower court will decide otherwise; it will take a
new Texas Supreme Court decision or legislative action before attorneys
will be liable to intended beneficiaries for their estate planning
malpractice.
5. Unauthorized Practice of Law
In June 1997, the Houston Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) Sub-
committee notified Nolo Press that it was investigating the sale of com-
puter software designed to assist purchasers to create living trusts. Nolo
Press responded. In March 1998, an investigator of the Dallas UPL indi-
cated that he had been assigned to investigate the situation in further
detail and that an informal hearing would be held in August 1998. Nolo
Press then requested additional information about the complaint, the in-
vestigation, the hearing process, and details regarding the inner workings
of the UPL. The Dallas UPL refused to provide much of this information
and cited confidentiality as the reason. Four weeks prior to the hearing,
Nolo Press petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for a writ of manda-
mus to compel the UPL Committee to supply a laundry list of informa-
tion and documents. The court granted the petition and stayed the
hearing.
In the case of In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc.,320 the court held that it
lacked jurisdiction to issue mandamus against the UPL Committee or any
of its members. 32' The court determined, however, that Nolo Press's pe-
tition should be treated in part as an administrative rather than a judicial
matter.322 It then vacated the court's 1986 order which limited disclosure
of Committee records.323 Thus, Nolo Press was entitled to the requested
information and documents. 32 4
Note that the 1999 Texas Legislature amended the definition of "prac-
tice of law" so that the sale of form preparation computer software to
non-attorneys is not the practice of law as long as the programs clearly
and conspicuously state that they are not a substitute for the advice of an
318. See id. at 406.
319. See id. The court did not sustain the summary judgment in favor of Attorney on
claims Slighted Children brought against Attorney in their representative capacity as Par-
ents' co-executors because Attorney failed to address these claims in his summary judg-
ment motion. See id.
320. 991 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. 1999).
321. See id. at 775-76.
322. See id. at 778.






A person considering marriage after accumulating a significant amount
of property in a retirement plan governed by ERISA must determine the
potential rights the new spouse will have in the principal and income
when the marriage ends, be it by the person's death or by divorce. For
example, in Lipsey v. Lipsey326 Husband had a 401(k) plan prior to mar-
riage which complied with ERISA. After less than a year of marriage,
Wife filed for divorce. The trial court held that the corpus of the plan was
Husband's separate property and that the increase in the plan's value
which occurred during the marriage belonged to the community. The
court awarded Wife a substantial portion of this increase and Husband
appealed.
The appellate court reversed.327 Husband argued that the undistrib-
uted income from the plan is not community property and thus not sub-
ject to the trial court's just and right division of the marital estate. Wife
asserted that ERISA vests her (the non-participating spouse) with a ben-
eficial interest in the plan. The court began its analysis by looking at
Boggs v. Boggs, 328 which considered the competing claims of a non-par-
ticipating surviving spouse and those of children from a prior marriage.329
In this case, however, Wife is not a surviving spouse because Husband is
still alive. Instead, the court was called upon to resolve a dispute between
the participating spouse and the non-participating spouse. Although ER-
ISA confers beneficiary status on a surviving spouse, it does not confer
this status on a non-participating spouse merely by reason of marital sta-
tus. 330 ERISA does not confer a right to the non-participating spouse but
simply allows for enforcement of an existing right that arises under the
domestic relations law of the state.331
Consequently, the court needed to determine if the increase in value of
Husband's 401(k) plan during marriage was community property under
Texas law. The court held that this increase in value was Husband's sepa-
rate property.332 Husband received no distributions from the plan during
the marriage. In addition, Husband had no right to compel a distribution
during the marriage because he had not yet reached the required age.
Thus, Husband had not acquired the increase in value and therefore the
increase could not qualify as community property.333 Although earned
during marriage, the plan income remained part of the trust estate and
325. Acts 1999, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 1507 (amending TEX. GOV'T CODE
§ 81.101).
326. 983 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
327. See id. at 347.
328. 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
329. See Lipsey, 983 S.W.2d at 351.
330. See id.
331. See id. at 350.




was not subject to division by the trial court. 334 The court then held that
"absent an existing community property right, ERISA's QDRO provision
does not create a community property interest. ' 335 The court also re-
jected Wife's claim that Husband constructively acquired the income. 336
"Absent fraud, a spouse may create a trust from separate property, and
so long as the income remains undistributed during marriage and there is
no right to compel distribution, the income is not acquired during mar-
riage and remains separate trust property. '337
7. Power of Attorney
In Comerica Bank-Texas v. Texas Commerce Bank National Associa-
tion,338 Principal appointed Agent in a "springing" durable power of at-
torney under which the Agent's authority would commence only upon
Principal's disability. Principal signed this power of attorney in 1986. In
1991, Principal created an inter vivos trust and holographic will. Principal
became incapacitated in 1995 and Agent used the power of attorney to
transfer some of Principal's property to the inter vivos trust. After Princi-
pal died, Executor sued Trustee to impose a constructive trust on the as-
sets Agent transferred to the trust alleging that the power of attorney was
either invalid or, if valid, it did not authorize agent to make the transfer.
The trial court granted Executor's request for a summary judgment.
The appellate court reversed. 339 The court recognized that the Probate
Code as it existed in 1986 did not expressly recognize springing powers of
attorney. 340 Nonetheless, there was nothing in the Probate Code or other
Texas law which prohibited their creation.341 Accordingly, the court de-
termined that Principal properly created a springing durable power of
attorney. 342
The dissenting opinion relies on the legislative history of the 1993 legis-
lation to show that springing powers were not previously authorized in
Texas.343 The opinion continues to explain that the enabling legislation
provided that powers of attorney executed before the effective date of
the statute are to be governed by the law in effect when the power was
executed.344 Accordingly, the justice concludes that the power of attor-
ney was invalid and ineffectual. 345
334. See id.
335. Id. at 351.
336. See id.
337. Id. at 351.
338. 2 S.W.3d 723 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. denied).
339. See id. at 727.
340. See id. at 725 (TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000), re-
pealed). Express authorization of springing powers is now found in TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 482 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
341. See id. at 726.
342. See id.
343. See id. at 727-28 (Cornelius, J., dissenting).





The 1999 Legislature made substantial changes to the statutes gov-
erning probate, wills, guardianships and trusts. The Governor vetoed two
bills. The first was an omnibus guardianship bill346 and the second was a
bill clarifying the transfer rights of the Probate Court No. One of Travis
County, Texas.347
In addition to the traditional session laws, all legislation, enacted or
proposed, can be found at This website was created and is maintained by
the State of Texas and provides not only the full text of any bill but also
the full history.
A. TEXAS PROBATE CODE
1. Section 3(d): Definition: Corporate Fiduciary348
Section 3(d) changed the definition of corporate fiduciaries to financial
institutions as defined by section 201.101 of the Finance Code that have
trust powers and are doing business under the laws of this state or an-
other state. The "another state" provision was added. A financial institu-
tion under the Finance Code is a bank, savings and loan, credit union or
trust company. It specifically includes not only those chartered federally
and in Texas but also those chartered by another state. This definition is
different from the definition of "financial institutions" under Chapter XI
of the Texas Probate Code on multi party accounts; which includes bro-
kerage firms.
2. Section 5(b): Mandatory Assignment of Statutory Probate Judges:
County Court
349
Before this amendment in counties with only a constitutional county
court, the county judge could transfer a probate matter to the district
court or assign it to a statutory probate court. The county judge, being the
chief administrative officer of the county, generally sent the matter to the
346. This bill, Tex. H.B. 1851, out of the 76th Regular Texas Legislative Session in 1999,
contained the original proposals from the Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law Section of
the State Bar of Texas plus several amendments. Governor Bush vetoed the bill because
one of those amendments would allow third parties to apply to the probate court for ap-
proval of a sports or entertainment contract with a minor. Bush's veto message said this
bill would interfere with the parental relationship.
347. The jurisdictional statute for the Travis County statutory probate court, Texas
Government Code Section 25.2293(d), requires the consent of the other court before a
matter can be transferred from that other court to the probate court. This is the only statu-
tory probate court with such a restriction. All other statutory probate courts can transfer
pursuant to Texas Probate Code section 5B without consent. Tex. H.B. 3635, also out of
the 76th Regular Texas Legislative Session in 1999, would have eliminated the consent
requirement. It also expanded the Travis County Probate Court's jurisdiction over matters
under the Health and Safety Code, Texas Government Code Section 25.2293(b). Gover-
nor Bush said this was an unnecessary expansion of that court's jurisdiction.
348. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(d) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
349. See Tex. H.B. 1607, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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district judge because there was no cost to the county. The assignment to
a statutory probate judge would be an additional expense to the county.
Now a probate litigant may insist on the appointment of a statutory
probate judge if a district judge has not already been appointed.
In addition, the appointed statutory probate judge will now have the
powers held by a statutory probate judge under sections 5A and 5B. Pre-
viously an appointed statutory probate judge only had the powers of a
judge of a constitutional county court.350
This provision is effective immediately.
3. Section 5A(b): Personal Representative is a Party: Jurisdiction351
In 1997 section 5A was amended to give the probate court jurisdiction
over all matters in which a personal representative was a party; all such
actions were "appertaining to estates and incident to an estate. '352 This
was also intended to allow transfers under section 5B. However, the
phrase "for the purpose of this section" was included in the 1997 statute.
This bill deletes "for the purpose of this section." With this bill, and the
amendments to section 5B, infra, statutory probate courts now have juris-
diction over, and can transfer, any matter in which a personal representa-
tive is a party. 353 This provision became effective September 1, 1999.
4. Section 5B: Personal Representative is a Party: Transfer Any
Proceeding354
This amendment to the transfer statute expressly authorized transfers
to probate courts any proceeding in which a personal representative is a
party.355 This became effective September 1, 1999 and applies to motions
filed on or after that date.
5. Section 5C: Ad Valorem Taxes3 5 6
The Legislature passed a bill effecting ad valorem taxes. It amended
parts of the Texas Probate Code. The amendments only apply to dece-
dents' estates that are currently under administration, where the estate
claims an interest and is not an independent administration.35 7 Suits to
enforce tax liens or impose personal liability for ad valorem taxes im-
posed in a county other than where the administration is occurring, must
be brought under Tax Code section 33.41 in a court of competent
350. There is a sister provision for guardianships, see Texas Probate Code Section
606(b).
351. See Tex. H.B. 1607, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
352. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5B (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
353. There is a companion provision in the Guardianship Code. See TEX. PROB. CODE
ANN. § 607(b) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
354. See Tex. H.B. 2580, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
355. Again, there is a sister provision for guardianships. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 608 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
356. See Tex. H.B. 3549, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).




If a probate proceeding has been pending for less than four years and
the probate is in the same county where the taxes were imposed, the tax-
ing unit may present a claim under Texas Probate Code section 5C, sub-
section (c). If they do file a claim they cannot then file an action in
another court. 359 If the taxing unit did not present a claim and the pro-
bate proceedings have been pending more than four years, it must bring
the action under Tax Code section 33.41 in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.360 Any action brought under this subsection must include the per-
sonal representative as a party.
Questions Raised by the Statute. The statute raises several questions. If
these rules do not apply to independent administrations, where are ac-
tions involving independents brought, the probate court? It does not
clearly tell us where to bring an action if the taxes and the probate are in
the same county and no claim was filed and four years have not elapsed.
Texas Probate Code section 5C, subsection (f) requires the personal rep-
resentative to be made a party (and may not have a personal judgment
taken against the estate) if the action is brought under subsection (e). It
does not explain the rules if the action is brought under subsections (b),
(c) or (d). Also, in subsection (e) it requires the personal representative
to be made a party if the estate has been open more than four years. In
practice after four years, most personal representatives will have closed
the estate or at least distributed all of the estate. There are conforming
amendments to the claims procedures.361
Guardianship. There is also an amendment to the guardianship code
waiving the requirement of presentment for delinquent claims when the
guardianship is in a different county. This suggests that presentment
must be made in a guardianship when the taxes arise in the same county
where the guardianship became pending.
Effective Date. This statute is effective September 1, 1999 and applies
to all estates and all actions pending on or after that date.
6. Section lOB: Decedent's Medical Records362
In 1997 this section was added to allow access to a decedent's medical
records when there was a will contest or other proceeding where a party
relies on the decedent's mental or testamentary capacity. The records
could be obtained upon presenting a certified copy of a document estab-
lishing a will contest. The 1999 amendment says a filed marked copy of
such a document is sufficient. This became effective September 1, 1999
and applies only to estates of persons dying after that date.
358. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5C(b) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
359. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5C(d) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
360. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5C(e) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
361. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 317(c) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
362. See Tex. H.B. 1852, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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7. Sections 15, 17, 17A & 18: Clerks' Records363
Clerks will now be required to keep a case file rather than "probate
minutes. '364 Rather than keep a judge's probate docket, 365 a claim
docket 366 and a probate fee book,367 the clerk may maintain the probate
information on microfilm or some form of electronic media.368 The clerk
shall keep an index of these records. 369 These records, including "records
on a computer file, on microfilm, in the form of a digitized optical image,
or in another similar form of data compilation," shall be evidence.370
8. Section 52: Affidavit of Heirship371
This bill provides a form for affidavits of heirship. The title insurance
industry was involved in preparing this statute. It is expected that its use
will be readily accepted by title companies. That form is attached as an
appendix.
9. Section 95C: Foreign Wills: Original Signatures372
If a will has already been probated in a foreign jurisdiction, it can be
probated in Texas by attaching an attested copy of the will and order
admitting it to probate to the application to probate the will in Texas. The
amendment to this statute requires the original signature of the judge and
clerk on the attestation. Seals or other mechanical reproduction of a
judge's or clerk's signature will no longer be acceptable. However, this
original signature requirement does not apply to wills and orders re-
corded in the deed records under Texas Probate Code sections 96 through
99 and section 107.
10. Section 105A: Appointment of Foreign Corporate Fiduciary373
This section has always controlled the circumstances under which a
court may appoint a foreign institution as a fiduciary. That authority is
continued but now a court may appoint only if a Texas financial institu-
tion can be appointed under the laws of the state of that foreign fiduciary.
Also, the court may require the foreign fiduciary to deposit all cash and
363. See Tex. H.B. 1142, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
364. See Tex. H.B. 1142, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), amending TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 15
(Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
365. See Tex. H.B. 1142, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), amending TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 13
(Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
366. See Tex. H.B. 1142, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), amending TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 14
(Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
367. See Tex. H.B. 1142, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), amending TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 16
(Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
368. See Tex. H.B. 1142, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), amending TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 17
(Vernon 1.980 & Supp. 2000).
369. See Tex. H.B. 1142, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999), amending TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 17A (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
370. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 18 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
371. See Tex. S.B. 1106, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
372. See Tex. H.B. 1176, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
373. See Tex. H.B. 2066, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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safekeep all other assets in financial institutions which have their main
office or a branch office in this state.
11. Section 128B: Citation: Wills Probated After Four years374
This is a new section. It sets out the citation requirements when a will
is offered for probate more than four years after death. It requires cita-
tion of the heirs.375 The citation, or waiver of citation, must state that the
will cannot be admitted to probate if the proponent is at fault. Further, it
specifies that if a prior will has already been admitted to probate, the
beneficiaries of that probated will must be served rather than the dece-
dent's intestate heirs. Finally, this statute confirms that wills can still be
probated after four years. In 1997 the Texas Legislature amended the
Texas Probate Code provisions on muniment of title. That legislation had
internal inconsistencies that suggested that a will could not be probated
after four years.376 This statute removes that uncertainty.
12. Sections 149A & C: Actions in "County Courts' '3 7 7
As a result of amendments over the years, Sections149A (demands for
accountings from independent administrators and executors) and 149C
(removal of independent administrators and executors) have had refer-
ences to different courts. This amendment makes the court references
consistent by referring to county courts as defined in section 3 of the
Texas Probate Code. Section 3 says that county courts include district
courts when they are exercising jurisdiction in contested matters.
13. Section 149D-G: Release of Independent Personal
Representatives378
An independent personal representative may now379 obtain a judicial
discharge under the declaratory judgment statute. If the independent per-
sonal representative provides an accounting with a distribution of the es-
tate, they may seek a judicial discharge for all matters which are fully and
fairly disclosed. The personal representative may retain a reasonable re-
374. See Tex. H.B. 1852, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
375. If there is a prior probated will, the beneficiaries of that will, rather than the heirs
at law, must be served. See id.
376. Prior to 1997 section 89A of the Texas Probate Code controlled the probate of a
will as a muniment of title. In 1997 the Legislature amended 89A and added 89B and 89C.
They are the pleading statute (89A), the proof statute (89B) and the judgment statute
(89C). The pleading and proof statutes required that the applicant plead and prove that
four years had not elapsed since the death of the decedent. The judgment statute had no
such restriction. This new section 128B confirms that a will can be probated after four
years if the applicant is not at fault. See id.
377. See id.
378. See id.
379. Previously, an independent executor or administrator was specifically prohibited
from conditioning distribution upon a release, Texas Probate Code section 151(d) stated
"An independent executor shall not require a waiver or release from the distributee as a
condition of delivery to a distributee." Now such a release can be obtained only by follow-
ing the new procedure. See Tex. H.B. 1852, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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serve. If the court determines that the reserve was not reasonable, it may
order a further distribution. The court may assess fees and costs of the
proceeding in favor of or against any personal representative or any
beneficiary.380
This act became effective September 1, 1999, but only applies to estates
of persons dying after that date.
14. Section 194(5): Safekeeping Depositories381
Only "financial institutions" 382 with their main offices or a branch of-
fice in the State of Texas can hold safekept funds.
15. Section 221A: Changing Resident Agent383
Before a person who is not a resident of Texas can be appointed a
personal representative, he must designate a resident agent for purposes
of service of process. There has been no explicit procedure for a personal
representative to change that resident agent. Effective September 1,
1999, a personal representative may change the resident agent and this
amendment applies to all changes made on or after that date.
16. Section 221B: Resignation of Resident Agent384
Similarly, there was no mechanism for a resident agent to resign. This
statute allows an agent to resign after giving notice to the personal repre-
sentative and filing with the court. The resignation is effective upon entry
of the court order. This procedure became effective as of September 1,
1999, and applies to all resignations made on or after that date.
17. Section 222: Removal of Personal Representative if There is No
Resident Agent385
A court may remove a personal representative if a new resident agent
is not appointed. This applies to all motions to remove filed on or after
September 1, 1999.
18. Section 270: Homestead Debts386
While there have been several recent amendments to the Texas Consti-
tution387 and the Texas Property Code 388 regarding permissible debts on
homesteads, no conforming amendments have been made to the Texas
Probate Code. This bill updates the Texas Probate Code to reflect all of
380. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.005 (Vernon 1997).
381. See Tex. H.B. 2066, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
382. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 3(d) (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).




387. See Tex. Const. art. XVI § 50.
388. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. COE ANN. §§ 41.001 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 2000).
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those changes. However, this statute became effective September 1, 1999
and purports to apply only to estates of persons dying after that date.
19. Section 322: Child Support, Class 4 Claim389
"[D]elinquent child support and child support arrearages that have
been confirmed and reduced to money judgment... 39o are new class 4
claims. Old class 4 claims for certain taxes, penalties and interest are now
class 5 claims. All other claims likewise move down: Unsecured are now
class 8. This act applies only to estates of decedents dying on or after
September 1, 1999.
20. Section 389: Guardianship Investment Statute Repealed391
In 1993 all guardianship provisions were moved to chapter 13, begin-
ning at section 601 of the Texas Probate Code and those sections are now
referred to as the Texas Guardianship Code. Several guardianship provi-
sions and references were overlooked and not removed in 1993. In par-
ticular, the contents of section 389 were copied to section 855 but section
389 was not repealed. This bill finally repealed that statute.
21. Sections 404 Closing Estates & 406 Final Accounts: Elimination of
Guardianship References392
These sections continued to have references to guardianships after the
1993 separation of the guardianship provisions. This bill eliminates all of
those provisions.
B. GUARDIANSHIP CODE
1. Section 601(5): Definition of Corporate Fiduciary393
See section 3(d) above.
2. Section 606(b): Mandatory Assignment of Statutory Probate Judges:
County Court394
In counties with only county courts, a litigant may insist on the appoint-
ment of a statutory probate judge if a district judge has not been ap-
pointed. The appointed judge would then have the powers held by a
statutory probate judge under sections 607 and 608.395 This statute be-
came effective immediately.
389. See Tex. H.B. 1348, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
390. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322 (Vernon 1980 & Supp. 2000).
391. See Tex. H.B. 1662, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
392. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 404, 406 (Vernon 1980 & Supp 2000).
393. See Tex. H.B. 2066, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
394. See Tex. H.B. 1607, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).




3. Section 607(b): Guardian is a Party: Jurisdiction396
This gives statutory probate courts jurisdiction over all matters in
which a guardian is a party. This conforms to the changes to section 5A
above (regarding decedent's estates) made in 1997 and 1999. This be-
came effective September 1, 1999.
4. Section 608: Guardian is a Party: Transfer Any Proceeding397
Like the amendments to §5B, supra, this allows a statutory probate
court to transfer to its court any proceeding in which a guardian is party if
the guardianship is pending in its court. This provision applies to all mo-
tions to transfer filed on or after September 1, 1999.
5. Sections 625, 627, 627A & 628: Clerks' Records398
See Texas Probate Code sections 15, 17, 17A and 18 above.
6. Section 633: Notice to Proposed Guardian399
If the applicant is not the proposed guardian, the guardian must be
named in the application and served with process. The Texas Depart-
ment of Human Resources sought this change as a result of it being fre-
quently named guardian without any prior notice.
7. Section 642: Standing400
A person may not bring or contest a modification or restoration pro-
ceeding if they have an adverse interest. The legislative history states that
a guardian does not have an adverse interest merely because they are a
guardian. Something else must be shown, such as the guardian has an
adverse action pending or is making some claim against the ward. This
amendment became effective September 1, 1999 and applies to all mat-
ters in which a final determination had not been made on that date.
8. Sections 646 & 647A: Certification Requirements for Court
Appointed Attorneys40'
To be appointed by a court in a guardianship, an attorney must be cer-
tified by the State Bar. The certification requirements are modified by
this bill. Now an attorney must complete only a three hour course (for-
merly four hours) provided by the State Bar of Texas. The first certifica-
tion expires after two years. If the attorney has been certified for the
immediately preceding four years, then the subsequent certifications are
good for four years.
396. See Tex. H.B. 777, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
397. See Tex. H.B. 2580, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
398. See Tex. H.B. 1142, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
399. See Tex. H.B. 2795, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
400. See Tex. H.B. 1663, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
401. See Tex. H.B. 919, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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9. Section 648A(b): Court Investigator's Duties Expanded40 2
This adds to the duties of the court investigator those duties "required
by this code."
10. Section 665: Guardian's Fees from Other Funds403
Previously a court could order a guardian's compensation for persons
serving solely as guardian of the person from the ward's estate. Now the
court may authorize those payments from county funds if there are such
funds budgeted. The legislature established a new grant program.a0 4
11. Section 665B(a): Attorneys Fees: Unsuccessful Applicants40 5
Now a court may authorize attorneys fees for guardianship applicants
who were successful. Those fees can be paid from the ward's estate or, if
his estate is not sufficient, from county funds if any have been so
budgeted.
12. Section 677A(e): Form: Designation of Guardian in Case of Later
Need 40 6
The form is amended to expressly allow the waiver of bond for a guard-
ian of the declarant's children.
13. Section 682: Eliminates Term Requirement from Applications40 7
Guardianship applications no longer have to set out the requested term
of the guardianship.
14. Section 682A: Applications for Guardianship Before Eighteenth
Birthday40 8
An application can be filed for a minor who will need a guardianship
after becoming an adult. The application can be for a guardianship of the
person or of the estate, or both. The application shall not be made more
than sixty days before the child's eighteenth birthday. This statute refers
to the filing of an application, it is not clear if that application can be
taken up before the child reaches eighteen.
402. See Tex. H.B. 1663, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
403. See Tex. H.B. 1852, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999); see also Tex. H.B. 2165, 76th Leg., R.S.
(1999).
404. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 531.125 (Vernon 1994); Tex. H.B. 3630, 76th Leg.,
R.S. (1999).
405. See Tex. H.B. 2165, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
406. See Tex. H.B. 3338, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
407. See Tex. H.B. 1663, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
408. See Tex. H.B. 2164, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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15. Sections 683 & 683A: Court Initiated Guardianships40 9
A court must have probable cause of incapacity to appoint an ad litem
or court investigator. An information letter from an interested person or
a physician's statement establishes probable cause. If the court creates a
guardianship, it may compensate the guardian ad litem from the ward's
estate. If the estate is unable to pay, it may compensate the guardian
from county funds if any are available. The information the letter "may"
contain is set out in section 683A.
16. Section 694A-I (House Bill 1663): Modification or Restoration
This bill expands the provisions regarding restoration or modification
of a guardianship. A ward may initiate the process by an informal letter.
Anyone has standing to bring the action or contest it, except as set out in
section 642. Except for good cause, a subsequent action may not be filed
for one year. Application requirements, set out in section 694B, are simi-
lar to those for a guardianship including listing names and addresses of
the ward's spouse, children and siblings, or next of kin, if the ward is over
sixty years of age.
The court shall appoint an attorney ad litem. That ad litem shall re-
present the ward only in that restoration or modification proceeding. The
statute has the unusual provision that at the hearing the court shall only
hear "relevant" evidence. The applicant has the burden of proof which is
a preponderance of the evidence. No modification or restoration shall
occur unless a doctor's certificate is also provided. The certificate must be
within 120 days of filing the application or after the application but
before the date of the hearing.
The ward may retain private counsel. That lawyer will be reimbursed
from the ward's estate if the court concludes that the attorney "had a
good-faith belief that the ward had the capacity to retain the attorney's
services. 410
These changes apply to all applications "in which a final determination
on the application has not been made" by September 1, 1999.411
17. Section 695A: Family Members to Replace Agencies412
If a guardianship program or a governmental agency which is serving as
guardian learns of a family member or friend who is willing and able to
serve, they shall bring this to the attention of the court. If the court deter-
mines that such a person's appointment is in the best interest of the ward,
the court shall cause an application for appointment to be filed.
409. See Tex. H.B. 2165, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
410. See id.
411. See Tex. H.B. 1663, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
412. See Tex. H.B. 2166, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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18. Sections 697 & 698: Reporting on Private Professional
Guardianship Program Employees4 1
3
Section 697 requires the county clerk to submit the names of the em-
ployees of all private professional guardianship programs which it has
certified to the Health and Human Services Commission.
19. Section 743(j): Guardian of the Person Reports Without an
Attorney
This bill makes clear that a guardian of the person may file his report
without the assistance of an attorney.
20. Section 868(f): Tomorrow Fund: An Approved Investment4 14
The Texas Tomorrow Fund is an approved and listed investment for
section 867 trustees if the trustee determines it is in the beneficiary's best
interest.
21. Section 875: Notice to Proposed Temporary Guardian415
Like section 633 for permanent guardianships, if the proposed tempo-
rary guardian is not the applicant, they must be given notice. This provi-
sion was included at the specific request of the Department of Human
Resources.
22. Sections 886-886F: POWs and MIAs 416
Receiverships for POWs and MIAs are moved to the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code.
C. PROPERTY CODE: TRUST CODE
1. Section 113.018: Investment Agents
Investment agents are added to the list of authorized agents that a trus-
tee may employ. This is a conforming statute to the delegation statute
(section 113.060).
2. Section 113.026: New Charitable Beneficiary4 17
A trustee may designate a new charitable beneficiary upon default of
the original, thus avoiding a court proceeding to select a new charity. The
new beneficiary shall be similar in purpose to the original charity. If the
settlor is living and capable of participating, the trustee shall consult with
the settlor. Their decision, or disagreement, shall be reported to the At-
torney General. If he does not agree with their decision, he may bring an
413. See Tex. H.B. 3630, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
414. See Tex. S.B. 112, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
415. See Tex. H.B. 2795, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
416. See Tex. H.B. 3343, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
417. See Tex. H.B. 115, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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action. If they have not agreed, he shall bring an action. This statute is
effective immediately upon enactment but only applies to trusts created
on or after the effective date.
3. Section 113.060: Delegation of Trust Investments418
Traditionally, the investment duty was nondelegable. 419 Now a trustee
may delegate and has a choice. First the statute says the trustee may sim-
ply delegate but will be liable for the conduct of the investment agent,
just like any other agent. Or, if the trustee complies with the terms of the
statute, the trustee will avoid liability for the errors or omissions of the
investment agent. The requirements include notice to the beneficiaries at
least thirty days before the trustee enters into the contract. The trustee
must exercise the care of a prudent person in selecting the investment
agent and establishing the scope and terms of the delegation. The trus-
tee's investigation of the proposed agent's credentials include the agent's
experience, performance history, financial stability, professional licenses,
and any bonds or insurance.
The investment agent must be subject to Texas court jurisdiction. The
delegation agreement must include the investment agent's agreement to
be subject to the trustee's investment standards under section113.056, and
the agent must assume liability for failing to follow that standard. Finally,
the trustee must periodically review the investment decisions of the
agent.
This act became effective September 1, 1999.
4. Section 113.1021: Annuities & Life Insurance in Charitable Trusts420
With this new statute, increases in the value of life insurance (before
death) and deferred annuities (before annuitization) in charitable trusts
are allocated to trust income. However, such increases are not subject to
distributions until the trustee receives cash. This makes NIMCRUTs (net
income makeup charitable remainder unitrusts; sometimes also referred
to as "spigot trusts") much more attractive to donors.42'
With this statute, when the annuity is cashed, the non charitable benefi-
ciary (typically the donor) can receive the make up distributions. The
trustee can make up the shortfalls from earlier years. Most significant, by
deciding when to make withdrawals from the annuity, the trustee can
control when distributions are made to the beneficiary.
418. See Tex. H.B. 1475, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
419. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 171(h) (setting out the traditional pro-
hibition of delegation rule, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 227 and 171 (allowing
delegation if the trustee acts with discretion and prudence). This new statute is based on
Section 807 of the Uniform Trust Act, Draft, National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws.
420. See Tex. H.B. 1373, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
421. For a discussion of NIMCRUTs and their uses, see "Estate Planning for the Large
Estate," Kathryn Henkel, 1997 Advanced Estate Planning and Probate Course, section 1.
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This act was intended to be limited to charitable trusts. However, the
restriction is only set out in the heading of the statute. Further, there is no
definition of a charitable trust. It is unknown whether it would apply to a
trust that has an incidental charitable beneficiary, such as an intervivos
trust which is the primary testamentary document and has a small be-
quest to a charity.
The proponents of this bill made it applicable to existing trusts by hav-
ing it apply to all allocations of principal and income after its September
1, 1999 effective date.
This is a default rule. To avoid it, this statute must be specifically
negated.
5. Section 114.032: Virtual Representation422
This bill extends the litigation concept of virtual representation to out
of court releases and other contractual agreements. If there is no conflict,
and if a minor or unborn or unascertained beneficiary's interests are ade-
quately represented, the contract will be binding on them even though
they did not sign the agreement. 423 This does not apply to agreements
which modify or terminate a trust. This act became effective September 1,
1999.
6. Section 115.002: Trust Venue 424
The venue rules for trusts were substantially rewritten in 1999. Before
this act, venue for an individual trustee was in the county of the trustee's
residence and for a corporate trustee it was in the county of the corpora-
tion's principal office. With this amendment, venue for an individual
trustee is in the county of the trustee's residence; or any "situs of adminis-
tration" of the trust for the past four years. For multiple trustees or a
corporate trustee venue is any "situs of administration" of the trust for
the last four years. An action against a corporate trustee may also be
brought in the county of its principal office. "Situs of administration"
means the location primarily responsible for dealing with the settlor and
the beneficiaries. 425
The statute is a clear mandatory statute. For just and reasonable cause
the court may transfer the proceeding. Reasonable cause includes, but is
not limited to, location of records and convenience of the parties and
witnesses. This act became effective September 1, 1999.
422. See Tex. H.B. 1475, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
423. See Article 3 of the Uniform Trust Act, Draft, National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws, and in particular, sections 303, 304 and 305.
424. See Tex. H.B. 2317, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999); see also Tex. H.B. 2066, 76th Leg., R.S.
(1999).
425. Compare to Section 205 of the Uniform Trust Act, Draft, National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
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D. PROPERTY CODE: OTHER
1. Section 5.011: Notice of Annexation426
This statute requires notice by sellers of the possibility of annexation.
It does not apply, inter alia, to transfers by a fiduciary in the course of
administration; nor by one co-owner to another co-owner, or by a family
member to a lineal descendant.
2. Sections 41.002 & 41.005: Urban Homestead Increased to Ten
Acres427
With the passage of the constitutional amendment in November of
1999, the urban homestead was increased from one acre to ten acres in
one or more contiguous lots. In addition, the statute spells out the factors
to consider in determining if property is urban or rural.
3. Section 42.002(a) (House Bill 1805): Life Insurance Exemption
Life insurance is exempt from creditors under this section and under
§ 21.22 of the Insurance Code. This Property Code provision has a
$30,000/$60,000 (individual/family) limitation and the Insurance Code has
no limitation. As a result of this apparent conflict, some bankruptcy
courts have held that the cash value of a life insurance policy counts to-
ward the $30,000/$60,000 limitation. By eliminating this reference, the un-
limited provision of the Insurance Code will control. This does not repeal
the life insurance exemption.
4. Section 42.0021(a): Roth IRAs 428
With this act, Roth IRAs are exempt as well as traditional IRAs. The
effective date says the exemption applies to all contributions made
before, on or after the date of the act.
5. Section 142.004(a): Tomorrow Fund in 142 Trusts429
The Tomorrow Fund is an approved investment for Section 142 trusts.
6. Sections 142.008 & 142.009: Structured Settlements430
This bill sets out the procedures for establishing a structured settlement
for a minor or incapacitated person.
426. See Tex. S.B. 167, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
427. See Tex. S.B. 496, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999); see also Senate Joint Resolution 22.
428. See Tex. H.B. 76, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999); Tex. H.B. 1081, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999);
Tex. H.B. 1476, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
429. See Tex. H.B. 68, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).




1. Sections 3.006, 3.401-3.406 & 7.002: Enhancement from Financial
Contributions431
These provisions were a last minute amendment in the Senate to a
house bill.432 They codify the rules for measuring reimbursement when
one estate makes financial contributions to another. 433 For example,
community funds are used to build an apartment house on a husband's
separate property lots; or community funds are used to pay down the
mortgage on the separate property of the wife.
The statute is phrased in terms of the community estate making contri-
butions to separate property. However, in Section 3.404 the same princi-
pals are extended to all financial contributions between the various
estates: his separate, her separate, their community. This bill made no
provision for community time, toil, and labor contributed to separate
property. 434
The statute provides that such contributions create an "equitable inter-
est" that does not create an ownership interest but rather gives rise to a
"claim . . . which matures on the termination of the marriage." The
amendment also provides that enhancement is the measure when com-
munity contributions discharge debt on separate property. The section
on debt retirement actually provides a formula.
The formula says the equitable interest is calculated by multiplying
the 'net enhanced value' (not defined) by the 'sum' (sic) created by
dividing
(1) the total amount of the payments made by the community estate
to reduce the principal of the debt on the separate property; by
(2) the sum of
(A) the amount computed under Subdivision (1);
(B) the total amount of the payments made by the separate es-
tate to reduce the principal on the debt; and,
(C) the total amount of any additional amount spent by the sep-
arate estate to acquire the interest in the property.
The statute authorizes a court to impose an equitable lien. Unfortu-
nately, it says a court "shall impose an equitable lien..." The amendment
affirms the inception of title doctrine.
Finally, it eliminates offsets for "use and enjoyment during the mar-
riage." For example there shall be no offset for living in the home. How-
ever, it is not clear if it also applies to income generated by the property.
It is assumed that this language was carefully selected and used to deal
with the frequent problem of the courts holding that living in the house is
an offset.
431. See Tex. H.B. 734, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
432. They were amendments to Tex. H.B. 734 which allows Texans to convert separate
property to community property, see the Texas Family Code section § 4.201.
433. See Anderson v. Gilliland, 684 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1985); see also Penick v. Penick,
763 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. 1988).
434. As a result, Jensen v. Jensen, 665 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. 1984) still controls.
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Financial contributions for improvements are not controlled by the
formula. In those situations, the value of the improvements on dissolu-
tion of the marriage is the measure.
The amendment is effective September 1, 1999. It goes on to say it
applies to suits for dissolution pending on September 1, 1999 or filed on
or after that date. Some observers have suggested that this means this
amendment only applies to actions for divorce and not to probate pro-
ceedings. There is no legislative history to suggest that distinction.
There has been substantial criticism from lawyers about this statute.
As a result, the legislative author has assembled a study committee of
family law and probate attorneys to study the statute and make recom-
mendations for the coming session.
2. Section 4.201: Family Harmony Bill (aka "The Bill Formerly Known
as the Transmutation Bill")435
With the passage of the enabling Constitutional Amendment 436 at the
November 1999 election, Texans for the first time are able to change sep-
arate property to community by written agreement.
All other community property states can already do this. Currently
separate property can only be converted to community by co-mingling.
Texans may want to do this for a variety of reasons including to maximize
use of the unified credit. If one spouse holds most of the assets as sepa-
rate property, there is a risk of losing unified credit. 437 If one spouse has
less than the unified credit amount and dies first, his or her unified credit
would be lost. This can be avoided by giving to that spouse sufficient
property to reach the unified credit amount. Also, if separate property is
converted to community, both halves enjoy a step up in basis on the
death of the first spouse. In many harmonious families, tracing of sepa-
rate property is an unnecessary expense. Conversion to community can
eliminate that process and its attendant costs.
There was opposition to this bill, primarily from the Family Law Sec-
tion of the State Bar and its members. They were concerned that people
would convert their separate property to community and have regrets
upon divorce. That is a legitimate concern and one that has to be care-
fully considered before entering into any such arrangement. Proponents
of the bill point out that converting to community is much less draconian
than the existing alternatives. A gift of separate property to the other
spouse which is then the separate property of donee spouse is not subject
to division by the divorce court. The donor spouse has no chance of re-
covering it on divorce, nor is it as drastic as the currently permitted prac-
tice of converting community to separate. Again, such separate property
435. See Tex. H.B. 734, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
436. See House Joint Resolution 36.
437. In 2000, a person may give away or die holding, or a combination of the two,
$675,000 without incurring any tax, see I.R.C. § 2001. That amount is increasing until 2006
when it will reach $1,000,000.
1288 [Vol. 53
PROBATE AND TRUSTS
is not available for division on divorce. In addition, the spouses, even if
they agree, could not (prior to the constitutional amendment) convert it
back to community.
There was also concern that any conversion to community property ex-
posed the converted property to an increased range of debts. However, if
the property is maintained as the sole management community of the
contributing spouse, the increase in range of liabilities is limited to tort
claims.
This bill became effective for agreements entered into on or after Janu-
ary 1, 2000.
F. CIVIL PRACTICE & REMEDIES
1. Section 16.004(a): Limitations for Fraud & Breach of Fiduciary
Duties438
This statute clarifies existing law and declares that actions for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duties have four year statutes of limitations. Accord-
ing to the legislative history, this does not change the current discovery
rule. Finally, it states that it is not intended to effect the current two year
statute for breaches of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in insurance
contracts. The bill says it is a clarification of existing law and does not
state its effective date. Presumably, it is effective immediately and ap-
plies to all pending actions.
2. Section 37.005: Declaratory Judgments for Independent Personal
Representatives Final Accounts439
This section has been expanded to clearly cover independent executors
and administrators. In addition, it specifically authorizes a court to de-
clare the legal rights of independent executors or administrators regard-
ing settlement of accounts and fiduciary fees. This is a companion
provision to the release of independent personal representatives under
Texas Probate Code sections 149D-G. This became effective September
1, 1999, but applies only to estates of persons dying after that date.
3. Section 64.101 - .108: POWs & MIAs 440
The receivership provisions for POWs and MIAs that were in the
Texas Probate Code are now in the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
438. See Tex. H.B. 2456, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
439. See Tex. H.B. 1852, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
440. See Tex. H.B. 3343, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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4. Sections 71.012 & 71.022: Certain Litigation Without Ancillary
Letters441
If a foreign personal representative complies with Texas Probate Code
§ 95, then he does not have to obtain ancillary letters under Texas Pro-
bate Code § 105 to pursue a wrongful death or survival action.
5. Sections 137.001 - .-008, .0010: Advance Directives442
If a physician is unwilling to comply with a directive, he must use rea-
sonable efforts to transfer the patient. A physician may use treatment
contrary to an advance directive if those instructions have not reduced
the severity of the behavior.
G. FINANCE CODE: ARTICLE 1, SECTION 1.001, TITLE 3, CHAPTER
201: INTERSTATE BANKING BILL4 4 3
This contains the same venue provisions found in House Bill 2317
amending the trust code. It makes several changes to the Texas Probate
Code regarding foreign corporate executors and administrators which
have been set out above. Finally, it adds a new Chapter 9 to the Texas
Trust Company Act.
H. GOVERNMENT CODE
1. Section 21.009(2): Brazoria County Courts at Law444
The reference to Brazoria County Courts at Law being statutory pro-
bate courts was repealed. Those courts no longer have the jurisdiction or
powers of a statutory probate court.
2. Section 25.1802(a): Nueces County Courts at Law445
Also, the statutory probate court jurisdiction of Nueces County Courts
at Law was repealed.
3. Section 25.00221: Statutory Probate Courts Intra County Transfers446
This act allows transfers of actions by a statutory probate court to an-
other statutory probate court or to another court having jurisdiction.
However, the statute is limited to courts within the same county.
4. Section 25.0003: Probate Jurisdiction of Statutory County Courts447
Statutory county courts do not have statutory probate court
jurisdiction.
441. See Tex. H.B. 3477, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
442. See Tex. S.B. 1361, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
443. See Tex. H.B. 2066, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
444. See Tex. S.B. 1150, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
445. See id.
446. See Tex. H.B. 1605, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
447. See Tex. S.B. 1150, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
1290 [Vol. 53
PROBATE AND TRUSTS
5. Section 25.1034(j): Harris County Case Assignment448
In Harris County, the clerk is now to assign and docket, "at random,"
matters and proceedings in the Probate Courts as follows: Statutory Pro-
bate Court No. 1 30%, Court No. 2 30%, Court No. 3 20%, and Court
No. 4 20%.
6. Section 25.2651: Multi County Statutory Probate Courts449
This statute allows several counties to voluntarily band together to es-
tablish a multi-county statutory probate court.
7. Section 54.601: Probate Masters450
This bill will allow statutory probate judges, with the consent and fund-
ing of the county commissioners, to appoint masters. This bill does not
apply to Dallas or Harris Counties.
8. Section 81.101: Unauthorized Practice of Law451
This bill is in response to an injunction entered against Quicken by a
Federal Court in Dallas.452 In that case, Judge Barefoot Sanders said that
Quicken's Family Lawyer program was the unauthorized practice of law.
This bill reverses that holding; it says producing and selling such a pro-
gram is not the unauthorized practice of law. However, it goes on to say,
in less than crisp language, that this does not authorize anyone (for exam-
ple bankers, real estate agents or insurance salesmen) to use any pro-
grams or forms to practice law. It appears to be merely an
acknowledgment of the right to act pro se.
This statute does not deal with the liability of Quicken or any other
provider, it merely says they are not practicing law. In addition, this
probably does not finally resolve the question.453 Given the importance
of the principals involved, the first amendment, a state's right to regulate
the practice of law and the advent of the computer and the internet, this
is more likely the beginning of this problem rather than the end.
9. Section 466.410: Lottery Prize Assignment454
This bill allows the assignment of lottery prizes. However, if there is an
IRS ruling or court determination that such provision causes an immedi-
ate income tax for those who do not assign their lottery prize, the right of
448. See Tex. H.B. 3854, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
449. See Tex. S.B. 1001, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
450. See Tex. S.B. 294, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
451. See SB 764, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999); see also Tex. H.B. 1507, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
452. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 813 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 1999, vacated, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999).
453. See In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W. 2d 768 (Tex. 1999) (discussing who
controls the practice of law: the Texas Supreme Court or the Texas Legislature).
454. See Tex. H.B. 1799, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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assignment shall cease. This bill also makes unclaimed lottery prizes
available for indigent health care.
10. Section 531.125: Guardianship Grants4 55
Grants will now be available to pay guardians when there are no other
funds available.
I. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
1. Chapter 166: Advance Directives456
This bill brings health care, living wills and out of hospital do not resus-
citate provisions into one statute. The Directive to Physician form is set
out at section 166.033. A person may now specifically provide that he or
she shall not receive artificial hydration or nutrition. Provisions for Out
of Hospital DNR (Do Not Resusitate) Orders are set out at section
166.083. The actual forms are not in the statute, but rather are to be pre-
pared by the state board. The Medical Power of Attorney is set out at
sections 166.163 & 166.164. This replaces the current Health Care Power
of Attorney. Existing Health Care powers are still valid, however, only
Medical Powers should be executed after September 1, 1999.
2. Section 593.081: Trust Funds For State Eleemosynary Inmates457
Currently trust funds of persons in state facilities is limited to $50,000.
This statute raises that amount to $250,000.
3. Sections 711.002(g) & (]): Inscriptions on Grave Markers45 8
Texans can now provide in advance what is to be placed on their grave
markers. There is now also a presumption that a married woman wants
her grave marker to reflect the last name she used.
J. INSURANCE CODE: ARTICLE 1.14-1A, SECTION 7: CHARITABLE
GIFT ANNUITIES 4
5 9
Charitable gift annuities are not subject to the requirements applied to
insurance companies in the issuance of annuities. Further, charitable gift
annuities are not subject to the deceptive trade practices act (Business
and Commerce Code, sections 15.05, 17.46 and 17.50(a)(3)).
K. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 118.052460
This bill eliminates the $3 for the first page and $2 fee structure for
probate filings. Instead there is now a $45 fee for original filings (includ-
455. See Tex. H.B. 3630, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
456. See Tex. S.B. 1260, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
457. See Tex. S.B. 1623, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
458. See Tex. H.B. 1571, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
459. See Tex. H.B. 823, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
460. See Tex. H.B. 2822, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
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ing the "additional, special fee" of $5), a $25 for annual and final ac-
countings, a $10 for annual and final reports of guardians of the person, a
$25 for applications for sale of real or personal property, $2 for claims,
and a $40 for adverse actions.
In addition, if you file your inventory after 120 days there is a charge of
$25. There continues to be a $3 charge for approving and recording the
bond and $2.00 for administering the oath.
L. NON-PROFIT CORPORATION ACT (ART. 1396-2.31 V.A.T.S.)
CHARITABLE IMMUNITY
4 61
These bills state that a charity is immune from any suit claiming that a
charity who is acting as a trustee is engaging in the trust business contrary
to the Texas Trust Company Act. Also, it provides for interlocutory ap-
peals if the defense of immunity is not granted.
M. TRANSPORTATION CODE SECTION 501.031462
Allows registration of motor vehicles, including mobile homes, to be
held in right of survivorship form. Previously, the right of survivorship
form could only be used by spouses.
N. TRUST COMPANY ACT: MULTISTATE TRUST BUSINESS, VATS
342A-9.001 ET SEQ.463
A trust may apply the laws of another state if the instrument does not
provide otherwise and the trust, or its subject matter, bears a reasonable
relationship to this state and to another state,464 or the "trust institution"
and its "affected client" agree to the application of the laws of "the other
state. '465 However, Trust Code Section 113.052 (restrictions on loans by
or to a trustee) and Section 113.053 (purchases or sales by a trustee) will
still apply and cannot be overridden by foreign law.
0. TEXAS CONSTITUTION: ARTICLE VII, SECTION 11 B PRUDENT
INVESTOR STANDARDS FOR THE PERMANENT
UNIVERSITY FUND
4 6 6
This constitutional amendment allows the Permanent University Fund
to now manage its assets according to the prudent investor rules rather
than the traditional prudent man rule.
In particular, this constitutional amendment says the Permanent Uni-
versity Fund shall be invested pursuant to the prudent investor standard.
All investments shall be taken into consideration, not single investments.
461. See Tex. H.B. 2066, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999); see also Tex. H.B. 3276, 76th Leg., R.S.
(1999).
462. See Tex. H.B. 381, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
463. See Tex. H.B. 2066, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999).
464. See Trust Company Act § 9.005(b).
465. See Trust Company Act § 9.005(c).
466. See House Joint Resolution 58.
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Available funds shall be based on total return on all investments. The
amount of distributions for the available fund shall be consistent with a
stable and predictable stream of annual distributions, maintaining the
purchasing power of the fund and its annual distributions, and the annual
distributions to the available fund shall not exceed 7% of the fair market
value of the permanent university fund investment assets.
PROBATE AND TRUSTS
APPENDIX
STATUTORY AFFIDAVIT OF HEIRSHIP FORM
SECTION 2. Chapter III, Texas Probate Code, is amended by adding
Section 52A to read as follows:
Sec. 52A. FORM OF AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS CONCERNING
IDENTITY OF HEIRS.
An affidavit of facts concerning the identity of heirs of a decedent may
be in substantially the following form:
AFFIDAVIT OF FACTS CONCERNING THE IDENTITY OF
HEIRS
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared
("Affiant") (insert name of affiant) who, being first duly
sworn, upon his/her oath states:
1. My name is (insert name of affiant), and I live at
(insert address of affiant's residence). I am personally
familiar with the family and marital history of
("Decedent") (insert name of decedent), and I have
personal knowledge of the facts stated in this affidavit.
2. I knew decedent from (insert date) until
(insert date). Decedent died on (insert date of death). Dece-
dent's place of death was (insert
place of death). At the time of decedent's death, decedent's residence
was - (insert address of decedent's residence).
3. Decedent's marital history was as follows: (insert marital
history and, if decedent's spouse is deceased, insert date and place of
spouse's death).
4. Decedent had the following children: (insert name, birth
date, name of other parent, and current address of child or date of death
of child and descendants of deceased child,
as applicable, for each child).
5. Decedent did not have or adopt any other children and did not
take any other children into decedent's home or raise any other children,
except: (insert name of child or names of children, or state
"none").
6. (Include if decedent was not survived by descendants.) Decedent's
mother was: (insert name, birth date, and current address or
date of death of mother, as applicable).
7. (Include if decedent was not survived by descendants.) Decedent's
father was: (insert name, birth date, and current address or
date of death of father, as applicable).
8. (Include if decedent was not survived by descendants or by both
mother and father.) Decedent had the following sib-
lings: (insert name, birth date, and current address
or date of death of each sibling and parents of each sibling and de-
scendants of each deceased sibling, as applicable, or state"none").
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9. (Optional.) The following persons have knowledge regarding the
decedent, the identity of decedent's children, if any, parents, or siblings, if
any: (insert names of persons with knowledge, or state
"4none").
10. Decedent died without leaving a written will. (Modify statement if
decedent left a written will.)
11. There has been no administration of decedent's estate.(Modify
statement if there has been administration of decedent's estate.)
12. Decedent left no debts that are unpaid, except: (in-
sert list of debts, or state "none").
13. There are no unpaid estate or inheritance taxes, ex-
cept: (insert list of unpaid taxes, or state "none").
14. To the best of my knowledge, decedent owned an interest in the
following real property: (insert list of real property in
which decedent owned an interest, or state "none").
15. (Optional.) The following were the heirs of decedent:
(insert names of heirs).
16. (Insert additional information as appropriate, such as size of the
decedent's estate.)




Sworn to and subscribed to before me on (date)
by (insert name of affiant).
(signature of notarial officer)
(Seal, if any, of notary)
(printed name)
My commission expires:
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